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IN T R O DU C T IO N
The process of crafting and promulgating technical standards for the Internet
is often hailed as a prime exam ple of how coordinated activity can take place on
a distributed network with little central autho rity or formal “law.” 1 Groups of
interested engineers and com puter scientists form working groups to study
particular Internet technical prob lems. Participation in these groups is gene rally
open. The  engineers and computer scientists  reach consensus on a particular
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2. Id. at 68.
We will argue that the same decentralized decision-making process that created
the Internet at a technical level may be able to create a workable and, indeed,
empowering and just form of order even at the highest level of the protocol
stack—the realm of rules applicable to the collective social evaluation and
governance of human behavior.
Id. Note that the groups that are responsible for technical standard-setting have by-and-large
made no such claims.
standard and, after review by other groups of engineers,  publish the standard on
the Interne t. The  standards are then volun tarily adopted by the Internet as a
whole. Th is coordination takes place, across  millions of computers around the
world, without any formal legal structure. The  working groups have no formal or
legal autho rity to set Internet standards;  nothing requires the computers on the
Internet to follow these standards.  Neve rtheless, the standard-setting proce ss has
served to coo rdina te orderly development  of Internet technical standards for the
past ten years. The  success of this open and consensus-based proce ss has led
some observers to  believe that nontechnical issues, such as regulation of fraud
and crime on the Interne t, may be resolved through analogous forms of
“decentralized, emergent law.” 2
Often overlooked, however, is the fact that the Internet*s technical standard-
setting proce ss rests on a number of highly contingent assumptions. One
fundamental assumption is that consensus is achievable. It is easy to see how this
assumption might hold  true in the realm  of technical standards.  The  Internet*s
technical standards are created and adopted by a relatively  small  com munity  of
engineers and programmers.  Such a com munity  can be expected to share a certain
set of common professional norms and values, at least as compared to the pub lic
as a whole. In addition, the technical nature of the standards means that relatively
objective factors can be employed to measure the desira bility of a particular
standard. Consensus under such cond itions may be much easier to achieve.
Mo reover, the coordination of technical standards may not solely be the result  of
consensus;  other factors, such as simple  adherence to custom or the lack of any
viable  alternatives, may also con tribute  to the orderly development  and adoption
of technical standards.
The  conditions that make possible  the existing consensus-based proce ss of
standards coordination may not exist in other areas of Internet governance.
Broader questions of Internet policy implicate the interests  of individ uals and
entities outside the relatively  small  com munity  of engineers and computer
scientists. As the universe of individ uals and entities expand s, the set of values
and norms similarly expand s. Consensus is far more difficult,  if not impossible,
to achieve when the stakeholders include not only engineers but also commercial
interests  and the pub lic at large. Mo reover, general policy questions,  such as
acceptab le standards of behavior on the Interne t, are not as subject to objective
measures and may,  in fact, involve highly contested value judgments. W here such
value judgments are at issue, the existing, consensus-based proce ss for technical
standard-setting may be inade qua te to deal with the particular problem. Although
much praise has gene rally been given to the decentralized and self-governing
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3. What I mean by “legitimate” will be fleshed out in more detail below. For present
purposes, however, a process will be considered more legitimate to the extent that it seeks to
take into account the interests of all of the various parties that have a stake in the issue to be
decided by that process.
aspects of Internet coordination, far less attention has been paid  to the possible
limits of the proce ss.
In this Article, I wish to explore the limits of the existing standard-setting
model of Internet coordination, using the Internet dom ain name controve rsy as
a case study.  Internet dom ain names,  such as “nike.com” or “harva rd.ed u,” are the
text-based addresses of the Interne t. Used initially as convenient mnemonics by
the engineers who created the Interne t, dom ain names have since come to signify
much more, as commercial interests have come to recognize their value as
tradem arks. Largely unbeknownst to the general public, a heated deb ate has
arisen over the past several years regarding the proper distribut ion of dom ain
names and the autho rity over such distribution. As the Internet has grown in scale,
it has become increa singly clear that the largely  informal mechanisms that had
governed dom ain name distribution during the Internet*s early years were
becoming increa singly ill-suited to the task. Various parties have accordingly
floated proposals for significan tly reforming the existing dom ain name system
and its administration, and one of these proposals is currently in the proce ss of
being implemented.
I will argue that these attemp ts to reform the system imprope rly rely, either
exp licitly or implic itly, on the technical standard-setting model of coordination.
That is, to one extent or another, they attempt to resolve the dom ain name
problem through some version of the dom inant,  existing method of Internet
coordination. These proposals fail, however, to fully app reciate  the fact that
dom ain name problems are not pure ly, or even primarily, technical in nature.
Rather, they are classic  pub lic policy questions,  requiring the resolution of
conflicting distribu tional and value claims. The  pub lic policy aspect of the
dom ain name problem unde rcuts  many of the assumptions that unde rlie the
standard-setting model of coordination. The  result is that attemp ts to use the
current standard-setting proce ss face serious legitimacy and implementation
prob lems. Although more recent attemp ts to reform the system are beginning to
recognize the limits of the standard-setting proce ss, they do not go far enough.
I beg in in Part I with a brief overview of how the dom ain name system works.
In Part II, I outline the technical standard-setting model of Internet coordination
and analyze the assumptions underlying that mod el. I also dem onstra te how
existing attemp ts at reforming the dom ain name system rely either implic itly or
exp licitly on the standard-setting mod el. In Part III, I argue that problems with
the dom ain name system are in fact not primarily technic al, but rather questions
of pub lic policy, and in Part IV, I analyze how this unde rcuts  the assumptions
underlying the standard-setting mod el. In Part V, I explore a number of
alternatives to the current standard-setting model and conclude that some minimal
level of government coordination may be necessary in order to ensure that the
dom ain name system is administered in a legitimate 3 fashion. I then conclude with
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4. Although a number of articles have discussed issues of Internet governance in general,
only a few have taken a sustained, close look at the issue from the perspective of the existing
standard-setting model that provides the baseline for Internet coordination. See Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?,
12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 443 (1997); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
“Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig,
The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Path of Cyberlaw];
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig,
Zones of Cyberspace]. But see David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on
Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, ¶ 1, available at <http://warthog.cc
.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/post.html>; Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-
Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996).
5. See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (last modified Feb.
20, 1998) <http://www.isoc.org/internet-history/brief.html>.
6. See P. Mockapetris, RFC 1034: Domain Names—Concepts and Facilities (Nov. 1987)
12 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <ftp://ftp.is.co.za/rfc/rfc1034.txt>; J. Postel, RFC 1591: Domain
Name System Structure and Delegation (Mar. 1994) (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.isi.edu/
in-notes/rfc1591.txt>. See generally Internet Requests for Comments (last modified July 22,
1998) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/information/rfc.html> (listing “Requests for
Comments” or “RFCs”).  Note that a domain name does not always map to an IP address–it can
also map to other types of records.  In addition, your internet service provider may assign you
a different IP address each time you log on.
7. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 5; Postel, supra note 6.
8. There are in fact 12 copies of the root directory, which all refer to a single “A” root
directory. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742
(1998), available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm> (visited
Nov. 11, 1998) (commonly known as the “White Paper”).
some cautionary thoughts about the application and extension of the consensus-
based model of Internet coordination to other Internet prob lems.4
I. A  SH O R T  IN T R O DU C T IO N  TO  T H E DO M A I N NA M E SYSTEM
A N D CU R R EN T PR O BLE M S
Let us beg in with a quick overview of how the dom ain name system works.5 A
dom ain name, by itself, is not sufficient to tell your computer where and how to
find a particular computer on the Interne t. To do that, your computer must
translate  the dom ain name into its corresponding numerical Internet Protocol
(“IP”) addre ss. Each computer on the Internet has a unique 32-b it IP addre ss,
which takes the form of four groups of numbers separated by dots  (e.g.,
128.103 .200.10).6 The  IP addre ss tells your computer spec ifically where and how
to find the computer you are seeking. Thus, when you type in “law.harvard.edu”
into your browser or e-mail  software, the first thing it needs to do is look up the
corresponding IP addre ss. To do this, it sends out a query into the Interne t.7
No single computer on the Internet autho ritatively tracks the IP addresses for
all of the dom ain names on the Interne t. Bec ause such a database wou ld be very
large and difficult to keep current, the dom ain name database is held  in a
distributed and hierarchical fashion among numerous computers across  the
Interne t. At the top of the hierarchy is a computer that holds the root direc tory,8
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9. See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (1998), available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm>
(visited Jan. 27, 1999) (commonly known as the “Green Paper”); Leiner et al., supra note 5.
10. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 5, 6.
11. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741; Alexander
Gigante, Blackhole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 413, 416 (1997); see also Josh A. Goldfoot, Note, Antitrust Implications
of Internet Administration, 84 VA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1998).  
Postel, a well-regarded and highly respected member of the Internet engineering community,
passed away unexpectedly on October 16, 1998, shortly after initiating the latest proposal for
reforming the domain name system.  See A Tribute to Jon Postel, Director of the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) (last modified Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.iana.org>;
James Glave, Net Mourns Passing of Giant (last modified Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.wired
.com/news/news/culture/story/15682.html>. For a discussion of Postel’s reform proposal, see
infra text accompanying notes 78-84.
12. The entity that controlled that computer would then have the authority to distribute
second-level domains within that top-level domain.
which contains a list of authoritative computers for all of the top-level dom ains,
both geographic (e.g.,  .uk, .de, .us, . jp) and gene ric ( .com, .gov, .edu).9 These
comp uters, in turn, con tain lists of the computers that are authoritative for the
second-level domains (e.g.,  mcdonalds.com, harvard.edu) within each top-level
domain, and so on. The  value of this distributed approach is that it allows addre ss
changes to be made at the most  local level,  and therefore obviates the need for
any huge, centralized administrative body to keep track of such changes. 10
Thus, using “law.harvard.edu” as an example, your computer wou ld query the
computer holding the root direc tory, which would tell your computer the addre ss
of the computer on the Internet that autho ritatively lists all dom ain name
addre sses within the “.edu” top-level domain. That computer would, in turn, be
able  to tell your computer the addre ss of the computer that autho ritatively lists
domains within the “harvard.edu” second-level domain, and so on, until your
computer finds the desired IP addre ss. In practice, not all of these steps may be
necessary, as computers on the Internet routine ly store or “cache,” for a limited
period of time, addresses that they have looked up relatively  recen tly. Thus, in
our example, your Internet service provider probab ly already knows the IP
addre ss for the top-level “.edu” domain, and possibly for the “harvard.edu”
second level domain.
The  parties that control the computers with authoritative information at each
level of the dom ain name hierarchy have de facto  control over the coordination
and registration of domains in that level of the hierarchy. For example, the root
directory was for a long t ime prac tically controlled by the Internet Assigned
Numb ers Autho rity (“IANA”),  a division of the Information Sciences Institute at
the University of Southern California, managed by a computer scientist named
Jon Postel.11 W hen a particular country wished to register for a geographic top-
level domain, IANA issued to that country a two-letter country code (e.g.,  .uk,
.de) and changed the root directory to include the new dom ain along with the IP
addre ss of the computer that had autho rity over that domain.12 Similarly, the
addition of new generic top-level domains required implementation through
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13. Although the root directory was ostensibly controlled by IANA, it was (and is)
physically maintained on computers operated by Network Solutions, Inc. See Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31, 742. Some doubt existed, however, over
what precisely would have happened if NSI had refused to follow an instruction from IANA.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
15. As of the date of this writing, ICANN is in the midst of considering how to open up the
registration function to multiple registrars, as part of the most recent plan to reform the domain
name system, which will be discussed in more detail below. See Joanna Glasner, ICANN to
Unveil New Rules (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://wired.com/news/news/politics/story/
17563.html>; see also infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
16. See Carl Oppedahl, Trademark Disputes in the Assignment of Domain Names, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 154, 160-66.
17. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742; NICHOLAS
BARAN, INSIDE THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 39-40 (1995).
18. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 414.
19. See V. Cerf, RFC 1174: IAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identifier
Assignment and IAB Recommended Policy Change to Internet “Connected” Status 2 (last
modified Aug. 1990) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc1174.html>.
20. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742; NSF
Cooperative Agreement, art. 2, pt. A.1 (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://rs.internic.net/nsf/
agreement/agreement.html>.
IANA.13 IANA thus coordinated and maintained the issuance of the top-level
dom ains, making sure that there were no conflicts. Autho rity over the root
directory has since been transferred from IANA to the newly-created Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers  (“ICAN N”), as part of the most
recent effort to reform the dom ain name system, which will be discussed in more
detail  below.14
Similar ly, Network Solutions,  Inc. (“NSI”) administers the databases that
con tain authoritative information regarding domains within a number of the most
important gene ric top-level dom ains, such as “.com ,” “.org,”  and “.net.”  Thus, if
a company wishes to register a second-level dom ain within the “.com” top-level
dom ain (e.g.,  burger.com), the company must go to NSI and ask for that domain.15
If that second-level dom ain has not yet been taken, NSI will register that second-
level dom ain and list both  the dom ain name and the corresponding IP addre ss in
its database. (NSI issues dom ain names on a first-come, first-served basis, with
some special provisions for dealing with trademark issues.16) The  company with
burger.com can then alloca te domains within that second-level domain, as it
wishes.
Bo th IANA and NSI origina lly derived their authority to coo rdina te dom ain
names ostensibly from the U.S. National Science Foundation (“NSF”).  The  NSF
played a significant role  in the initial funding and development  of the Interne t,
and in fact constructed the first high-speed “backbone” connecting various
regional networks.17 The  NSF was also respo nsible  for opening up the Internet to
commercial interests  and the general public.18 The  NSF origina lly delegated the
autho rity to administer the root directory to IANA,19 and contracted with NSI and
AT&T (collectively known as “InterNIC”) to provide administration and
registration services for a number of the gene ric top-level dom ains.20 It was thus
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21. See Sharon Eisner Gillett & Mitchell Kapor, The Self-Governing Internet: Coordination
by Design, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 3, 22 (IANA*s “performance of
this function is a product of history, not design. [Jon] Postel picked up the role of number
coordinator because it needed to be done when he was a graduate student involved in the birth
of the [Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (“ARPANET”)], and he never quit doing
it.”); Robert Shaw, Internet Domain Names: Whose Domain is This?, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET, supra note 1, at 107, 120-23 (unsuccessfully attempting to trace the formal authority
supporting IANA).
22. See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 64 (“[D]omain name look up tables function
because local hosts point their domain name servers at these tables; a form of custom, not law,
dictates the particular root servers to which local hosts point for this information.”).
23. See David R. Johnson, The Price of Netizenship (last modified Nov. 12, 1996)
<http://www.cli.org/pon.html> (“[I]n theory at least, anyone anywhere in the world can . . . set
up a ‘registry’ and associated lookup tables that map domain names to IP addresses.”).
24. See AlterNic Index (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://alternic.net>; David Hakala & Jack
Rickard, A Domain by Any Other Name! (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://boardwatch.
internet.com/mag/96/oct/bwm9.htm>.
25. Moreover, a partially successful effort would result only in a splintering and
fragmenting of the Internet.
26. Sometimes the question of who controls the root server is asked in the form: who
“owns” domain name space? This formulation is less than helpful. It assumes that domain name
space is a form of property subject to “ownership” by some entity. The description above
should make it clear that no one “owns” domain name space since no one has the universally
recognized legal authority to control the various domain name servers. Rather, control over the
root server is de facto. No legal obligations require Internet hosts to consider the root server
as authoritative. Indeed, the key characteristic of the entire domain name system is that it is
largely legally voluntary; there exist few lines of binding legal authority.
through its contract with the NSF that NSI origina lly obtained authority to
alloca te dom ain names within those gene ric top-level dom ains.
It is important to note that the NSF*s own autho rity over dom ain name
administration, and acco rding ly the autho rity of the various entities to whom it
delegated such autho rity, was largely  de facto.21 No formal legal strictures (e.g.,
statutes, regulations, or contracts)  required computers on the Internet to accept
their databases as authoritative.22 Theore tically, all of the computers on the
Internet cou ld have decided, and cou ld today decide, to accept as authoritative the
version of the root directory held  by another party  and point their browsers or
other software programs to an alterna te server.23 Indeed, at least one individ ual,
Eugene Kashpureff, has attempted (with limited success)  to set up a competing
registry,  with a competing root server.24 Th is other party  wou ld then have de facto
autho rity to issue additional top-level dom ains. In practice, however, such a result
is unlikely,  as widespread coordination of millions of computers wou ld be
extrem ely difficult.25 The  important point is that the autho rity of IANA and NSI
over dom ain name allocation and administration was largely  a matter of custom
and historical contingency; it was not based on any identifiab le legal claim of
right.26
As the Internet has grown, and as more and more commercial interests  and
members  of the general pub lic have come onto  the Internet, dissatisfaction has
grown with various aspects of the dom ain name system, and the largely  informal
mechanisms that had up until recen tly governed the dom ain name system have
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27. See infra notes 87-88.
28. Others have expressed dissatisfaction with NSI*s efforts at resolving domain name and
trademark conflicts. See Hakala & Rickard, supra note 24.
29. The most recent versions of Netscape automatically place a “.com” after a text string
entered into the address box, if that string is missing a generic top-level domain. See Oppedahl,
supra note 16, at 156, 169-71 (discussing the importance of a “.com” address for commercial
entities).
30. See infra text accompanying note 106.
31. See infra text accompanying note 107.
32. See Niall McKay, Network Solutions Hangs On (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) <http://
www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15453.html>.
come under increasing scrutiny.  Although these problems will be discussed in
more detail  below, it is worth  quick ly mentioning them here. First,  the dom ain
name registration system has come into increasing conflict with trademark law.
Numero us lawsuits  have been filed by trademark holders against parties who have
registered dom ain names corresponding to their trademarks.27 These suits have
led some to question the current allocation proce ss and, indeed, the current
structure of dom ain names themselves.28 Second, the trademark conflicts noted
above, and the corresponding proposals to reform the system, have highlighted
the lack of clear authority regarding control of the dom ain name system and, in
particular, control of the “.com” domain, which has become (literally) the defau lt
dom ain for commercial entities on the Interne t.29 NSI*s de facto  mon opo ly over
the registration of the most  desira ble  top-level domains and its particular policies
have generated much concern.
Even more worrisome have been concerns about the future governance and
stability of the dom ain name system. The  contract between the NSF and NSI was
scheduled to expire on September 30, 1998. Prior to its expiration, the NSF
announced its intention not to renew the contract and to withdraw from dom ain
name coordination altogether.30 The  resulting vacuum in autho rity created
substantial unce rtainty over what wou ld happen after the expiration date. NSI
claimed that it possessed continuing autho rity to register dom ain names,  while
other interested parties sought to reform the existing dom ain name system to
addre ss some of the concerns mentioned above.31 In the end, government
intervention and an extension of the contract by the NSF forestalled any crisis in
the dom ain name system and ensured some continuing stability and coordination
of the dom ain name system while  enabling further discussions of the matter.32
However,  lingering questions of autho rity and legitimacy rema in to be resolved.
The  dom ain name system is thus presented with a number of challenges,  both
short-term and long-term. Some challenges involve conflicts between existing
practices and spec ific bodies of law, such as trademark. Other challenges involve
more fundamental questions about the continuing administration and future shape
of the dom ain name system as a whole. The  main  question that this Article  is
interested in asking is whether the existing processes of Internet governance and
coordination, which have up to now have coordinated the Internet with little
central governance, are up to the task of meeting these challenges.
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33. Other committees also play a role in the standard-setting process. The Internet
Architecture Board (“IAB”), another related group of computer scientists and engineers,
develops general guidelines for Internet research. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 417. The
Internet Research Task Force (“IRTF”) focuses on longer-range engineering problems faced
by the Internet. See id. The Internet Society (“ISOC”) is a nonprofit corporation founded in
1992 composed of various companies, agencies, and individuals involved in Internet industries.
See id. The ISOC is generally considered the most likely candidate for overall Internet
governing body and provides the formal legal umbrella for many of these other bodies. See,
e.g., E. Krol & E. Hoffman, RFC 1462: FYI on “What is the Internet?” 4 (last updated May,
1993) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc1462.html>. Still other bodies play a role in
standard-setting. The IETF, however, is the main body with the primary responsibility for
drafting and issuing Internet technical standards.
34. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 417; R. Hovey & S. Bradner, RFC 2028: The
Organizations Involved in the IETF Standards Process 1 (last modified Oct. 1996)
<http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc2028.html>. Membership in the IETF is generally
open to computer engineers “with reasonable credentials.” David W. Maher, Trademarks on
the Internet: Who*s in Charge? (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.aldea.com/cix/
maher.html>.
35. See, e.g., Hovey & Bradner, supra note 34, at 2.
II. TH E ST A N D A R D -SE T TIN G M ODEL O F CO O R D IN A T IO N
The coordination of the current dom ain name system is an exam ple of the
general technical standard-setting model used to coordinate  the Internet as a
whole. Th is model is based very much on consensus and a deference to expertise.
Groups of computer scientists, engineers,  and programmers  gather to discuss
various technical issues. Rough consensus is reached on a particular technical
standard, which is published on the Interne t. Once published and shown to work,
technical standards are then volun tarily adopted by those connected to the
Interne t. Underlying this proce ss are a number of key assumptions regarding the
character of technical standards.  Many  proposals for reforming the dom ain name
system rely, exp licitly or implic itly, on some version of this standard-setting
model of coordination.
A. The Standard-Setting Process and Sources of
Coordination
The Interne t’s technical standards are set through a proce ss that bears a
surprising resemblance to the low-tech ideal of the New England town meeting.
The  body with de facto  respo nsibility for setting Internet standards is the Internet
Engineering Task  Force (“IETF”),33 which is composed primarily of computer
scientists, programmers,  and engineers.34 The  IETF holds open meetings three
times per year, at which various parties are permitted to comment  on numerous
issues surrounding Internet technical standards. 35 After these meetings, working
groups within the IETF consider the various com ments and come to consensus
around a particular technical standard. These standards are then approved by the
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36. See supra note 33.
37. See Shaw, supra note 21, at 114-15, for a useful chart listing the main Internet
governing bodies. See also Leiner et al., supra note 5.
38. But see infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
39. This is a simplified version of the process, though accurate for our purposes.  In
practice, technical standards may gain increasing acceptance over time, as they are shown to
work.  Other technical standards may be optional (e.g., providing a different way to do the
same thing) and, accordingly, may not be adopted by all.
40. Indeed, protocol standards could, in theory, be developed by other bodies and, if
accepted by the Internet community as a whole, become standard. See Gillett & Kapor, supra
note 21, at 20 (“[N]othing stops companies from inventing their own protocols and attempting
to turn them into universal standards through marketing genius, instead of through the IETF
(at least initially).”) (parenthetical in original).
41. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“No single entity—
academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit—administers the Internet. It exists and
functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate operators of computers
and computer networks independently decided to use common data transfer protocols to
exchange communications and information with other computers . . . .”), aff*d, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
42. See Johnson, supra note 23 (characterizing the relationships between the various
entities as a series of informal contracts).
Internet Architectural Board  (“IAB”)36 and then published on the Internet in the
form of a Request for Comm ent (“RFC”).37
The standards are then adopted and implemented volun tarily38 by the wider
Internet com munity. 39 The central and salient fact about the Internet coordination
proce ss is that no central body has the de jure autho rity to mandate  adopt ion of
the standards published in the RFC s.40 The  Internet is a network with distributed
intelligence. Because no single computer con trols the Interne t, the adoption of a
given standard cannot be made at a single locus but,  instead, must be adopted in
a distributed fashion by all of the computers on the Interne t. The  miraculous part
is that this occurs without any formal mandate or legal obligation.41 W ith a
surprising degree of noncentralized coordination, the standards are volun tarily
adopted by thousands of system operators all throughout the Interne t.42
A number of factors con tribute  to the widespread adoption of such standards.
First,  custom plays  a large role. Technical standards have historically been
adopted and propagated in this fashion. Th is is the Interne t’s way of coordinating
such standards.  Second, deference to expertise also plays  a role. The  IETF, which
includes a number of founders of the Interne t, commands a degree of respect
within the Internet com munity.  There  is a general belief that the standards crafted
by the IETF are obj ectively  good standards,  worth  adopting. Mo reover, the IETF
is wide ly assumed to have no other agenda than to look out for the best interests
of the Interne t. Finally,  network effects may also serve to bind individ uals to
continuing adherence to this proce ss and custom. As more parties adopt a given
standard, the value of that standard increases. Converse ly, leaving that standard
entails  greater and greater cost.  The  existing custom of technical coordination
1999] DO MA IN NAME CASE STUDY 597
43. See generally ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 846-47 (1997) (general discussion of network effects); Mark A. Lemley
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479
(1998) (same); J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of
Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996) (same); J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis,
Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133, 147
(same); Brian W. Arthur, Positive Feedback in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92, 93
(same); Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 41
(1989) (same); Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332
(1985) (same); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation,
16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985) (same); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 435 (1985) (same).
44. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 18-28 (analyzing the coordination of the “1
percent” needed to make the Internet work).
45. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742
(1998).
46. See Don Mitchell et al., In Whose Domain?: Name Service in Adolescence, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 258, 259-61.
47. These tasks have since been transferred to ICANN. See infra text accompanying notes
74-83.
48. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 21-23. These regional Internet registries (“RIRs”)
are Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (“RIPE NCC”), for European Internet
Service Providers (“ISPs”); Asia Pacific Network Information Center (“APNIC”), for Asian-
Pacific ISPs; and InterNIC for any other place in the world. Both RIPE NCC and APNIC are
operated and funded by a consortia of Internet connectivity providers. See id. at 22-23.
InterNIC is discussed supra text accompanying note 20.  
49. See Cerf, supra note 19, at 1.
gives rise to a powerful network externality.43 Tho se who fail to adopt a standard
wide ly adopted by others will effectively  be severed from the Interne t.
Even though the adoption of standards is distributed and no centralized control
exists, some minimal degree of centralized coordination is necessary to mainta in
certain  aspects of the pro toco l.44 For example, the Internet protocol requires that
all computers be aware of certain  common parameters and values, in order to be
able  to com munic ate with each other.45 In order to ensure that the parameters and
values are consistent, there must be some source on the Internet that contains the
authoritative parameters and values so that when disputes arise, reference can be
made to an authoritative source. Similar ly, some central body must be trusted
with coordination of Internet addre sses. Because each Internet addre ss is unique,
some central repository must alloca te Internet addresses and keep track of them
in order to prevent conflicts.
Such minimal coordination functions are vested in certain  trusted bod ies,46 and
their autho rity is largely  de facto. For example, IANA was for a long t ime
respo nsible  for many of the coordination functions.47 Among  other tasks, it
managed the allocation of various Internet protocol parameters, it allocated
blocks of nume rical IP addresses to regional registries (which in turn allocated
them to Internet service providers),48 and it also maintained the root directory for
the dom ain name system, which contains the authoritative sources for the top-
level dom ains.49 The  autho rity wielded by such coordinating bodies is largely  de
facto, rather than de jure. Nothing legally requires Internet computers to refer to
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50. The full credo reads: “We reject Kings, Presidents, and Voting: We believe in rough
consensus and a running code.” Transcript of Dialogue Between J. Zittrain and D. Clark: On
the Issue of Domain Names . . . (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.harvard.edu/fallsem97/
trans/clark/> [hereinafter Dialogue].
51. Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167 (1991) (stating that “members of tight social groups will informally encourage each other
to engage in cooperative behavior”).
52. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258 (“The Internet grew from a small research
experiment to the huge global enterprise it is today in a relatively closed and protected
environment whose cultural ethics were based on cooperation and collegiality . . . .”).  Indeed,
the respect for, and deference to, expertise may play a significant role in quelling dissenting
views.
these sources for authoritative information. Yet strong network effects  essentia lly
bind Internet partic ipants  to these authorities.
B. Assumptions Underlying the Standard-Setting Model
The standard-setting process described above relies, for its success, upon a
number of unstated and close ly related assumptions, both about the nature of
technical standards and the identity of those who have an interest in such
standards.  For the past several years, these assumptions have by and large held
true, and technical standard-setting has progressed in a relatively  coordinated
manner, with little central control or direct assertion of autho rity. Th is proce ss,
however, is coming under increasing pressure as the Internet is opened up to a
wider and wider population, as more interested parties wish to partic ipate  in the
standard-setting proce ss, and as the stakes increase. The  extent to which these
assumptions hold  true in the future will determine the continuing success of this
model of Internet coordination.
Forem ost among these assumptions is a belief in the possibility of “rough
consensus”  in arriving at technical standards.  The  phrase  “rough consensus and
running code” was coined by David Clark of MIT, one of the original “founders”
of the Interne t, and it aptly captures the philosophy behind the current standard-
setting proce ss.50 Under this view, no central autho rity is necessary if rough
consensus among the relevant stakeholders can be achieved around a working
standard. Once such consensus is achieved, the standard can be propagated
throughout the Interne t. Consensus,  of even the rough variety,  can thus lead to
coordinated activity without any central autho rity (“kings” and “presiden ts,” in
Clark ’s formulation).
The  belief in the possibility of a “rough consensus”  is itself, however,
dependent  upon a number of specific, and con tingent,  circumstances. Consensus
is more com mon ly achieved among relatively small communities with shared
values.51 The  engineers comprising the IETF are such a com munity.  The  broader
population of system administrators affected by the standards is also part of the
same com munity.  Although differences may exist among the engineers, these
differences exist within a larger set of norms of the engineering com munity  as a
whole. Among  these norms is a recognition of and respect for technical
expertise.52 Rough consensus is also more easily achieved when the relevant
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53. Indeed, the extent to which a given standard is adopted is often a function of the extent
to which it is shown to work in practice.
54. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 22 (“Assigning [protocol parameters] takes more
effort to discuss than to do . . . .”).
55. See William A. Foster, Registering the Domain Name System: An Exercise in Global
Decision-Making, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 194, 198 (“John [sic]
Postel has a long history of making technically sound decisions that have worked for the IETF,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and users of the Internet. It is this history that has given
IANA its authority.”); Shaw, supra note 21, at 120 (“There is little doubt that a sagacious
IANA has played an important role in consolidating the stability of the Internet.”).
56. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,741-42
(1998) (“[T]he U.S. government has played a pivotal role in creating the Internet as we know
it today.”). 
metrics are relatively  technical and objective in nature. Technical standards,  after
all, are meant to be implemented. Accord ingly, they can be measured for
performance.53 Coordination of technical standards (such as whether addresses
shou ld be 16-b it or 32-b it) involves fewer of the value judgments that generally
attend nontechnical policy issues.
Coordination is also made possible through an implic it recognition by others
that the existing proce ss is a legitimate  one. Mem bers of the Internet com munity
recognize the legitimacy of the IET F’s pronoun cements not only because  they
come from a respected source, but also because  of a sense that the IETF does an
adequa te job of speaking for the relevant interested parties, in this case primarily
the operators of systems connected to the Interne t, who are direc tly affected by
the s tandards. Even if a particular computer programmer disagrees with the
particular implementation of a standard, there is a sense that relevant viewp oints
have been considered and the relevant stakeholders have had a chance to voice
their opinions.
Th is type of technical coordination is only possible  if there exist trusted
institutions to take care of the minimal coordinating functions. The  coordination
of pure ly technical standards is largely  administrative. The  control of certain
parameter lists and values, while  certain ly requiring judgment, does not implicate
any large degree of value judgment.54 Judgment exercised in this coordinating
function can gene rally be measured against a performance metric. And
historica lly, such judgment has been entrusted by the IETF to “one of their own ,”
who has garnered the respect of the com munity  for being objective and fair
minded— in this case, for example, Jon Postel.55
Finally,  the perceived legitimacy of the various coordinating institutions may
also be a function, to an underappreciated extent,  of a background  government
presence. The  governmen t, through the Department  of Defense’s  Advanced
Research Pro jects  Agency (“DARPA”)  and the NSF, played a significant role  in
the initial funding and development  of the Internet and plays  a continuing role  in
the funding of various parties.56 The  background  involvement of the government
may in fact play a part in the perceived legitimacy of these institutions by
providing a background, public-interest check. To the extent this is true,
coordination of Internet standards through such institutions may not be as
“private” as com mon ly believed.
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57. See, e.g., G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between
Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277, 310
(1997) (advocating the creation of domain name “masks” which would list multiple parties
sharing the same domain name, along with a description); David Collier-Brown, On
Experimental Top Level Domains (last modified Sept. 1996) <http://turing.sci.yorku.ca/
~davecb/tld/experiment.html>.
58. See, e.g., James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan, Can Trademark Law Regulate the
Race to Claim Internet Domain Names?, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1996, at 10, 12.
59. See, e.g., Paul Vixie, External Issues in DNS Scalability (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/vixie.html> (calling for the issuance of meaningless “license
plates” instead of domain names). Vixie subsequently withdrew this proposal in favor of an
alternative proposal involving multiple registries. See Maher, supra note 34.
60. See Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU) (last modified Feb.
28, 1998) <http://www.gtld-mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html> [hereinafter Generic Top Level
Domain Memorandum of Understanding].
61. Id; gTLD-MoU: Frequently Asked Questions (last modified June 1, 1998) <http://www
.gtld-mou.org/docs/faq.html>.
62. See Memorandum of Understanding for the Internet Council of Registrars
(“CORE&shy; MoU”) (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/core-mou.htm>.
C. Do ma in Name Prop osals: The Standard-Setting Model
Many proposals for reforming the dom ain name system have essentia lly
adopted, either explicitly or implic itly, the standard-setting method of
coordination, or a close analog to it. For example, some early proposals were set
forth to change the structure of the dom ain names themselves in order to elimina te
existing conflicts between trademark law and dom ain name registration.57 Under
some such prop osals, a dom ain name might include both  a geographic limitation
and a subject matter l imitation58 (e.g.,  mcdonalds.fastfood.us). Other proposals
similarly sought changes in the shape and appearance of dom ain names in order
to addre ss spec ific problems facing the domain name system.59 Although many
of these proposals  did  not direc tly addre ss questions of implementation, they
implic itly assumed that implementation would be effected through the existing
standard-setting proce ss. As in the past,  a committee wou ld be formed to addre ss
the questions, and then, after consensus was achieved, an RFC would be
published and subsequently adopted by the Internet com munity  as a whole.
One prominent early dom ain name proposal was the Generic  Top Level Do main
Mem orandum of Understanding (“gTLD MoU” or “MoU ”).60 Instead of changing
the structure of the dom ain names themselves,  the gTLD MoU  proposed the
addition of new top-level domains (e.g.,  . fi rm, .store, .rec, .nom) to the existing
top-level domains (e.g.,  .com, .gov), in order to addre ss concerns about the
scarc ity of dom ain names. 61 In addition, it proposed that registration services for
top-level domains be opened up to competition among registrars.62 Finally,  it
argued for the establishment of an international body to administer the system and
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63. Id.; see also Summary of Comments: Registration and Administration of Internet
Domain Names, pt. C (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname
/DNSComments_SUM.htm> [hereinafter Summary of Comments] (summarizing the views of
some trademark holders that the creation of new gTLDs “would confuse users, increase
opportunities for the selection of infringing domain names, and make it harder for trademark
owners to police their marks”).
64. See supra note 33.
65. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 419.
66. See Network Solutions’ Preliminary Response to the IAHC*s Draft Specifications for
the Administration and Management of gTLDs (last modified Jan. 14, 1997) <http://netsol.com
/news/apr_19970114.html> (“[N]o one has the legal basis, delegated by statute or otherwise,
to oversee and direct the affairs of the Internet. Without legal mandate, the Committee must
seek and obtain consensus for its actions.”).
67. See Generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (last modified Dec.
14, 1998) <http://www.gtld-mou.org>. A major weakness in the MoU was its inability to
compel NSI to comply with its terms. Despite the efforts of the MoU, NSI continued to insist
that it would maintain control over the registration of top-level domains under its control. See
Kenneth Cukier, Internet Row Prompts Major Shake-Up (last modified Feb. 3, 1997)
<http://www.emap.com/cwi/177/177news2.html>.
68. See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (1998).
to deal with disputes over dom ain name “ownership .”63 Th is body would be made
up of representatives from a number of existing Internet stakeholder groups.
Although the MoU, unlike other propo sals, did  not rely on existing standard-
setting proce dures,  the implementation proce ss it pursued was close ly analogous
to such procedures and relied on many of the same assumptions. In 1996, the
International Ad Hoc Committee (“IAHC”) was formed to study the dom ain name
problem. The  IAHC was composed of nominees from a number of existing
Internet governance groups (e.g.,  IAB, IANA, ISOC),64 as well as the W orld
Intellectual Pro perty  Organizat ion (“WIPO”)  and the Inte rna tional
Telecomm unications Union (“ITU”).65 The  IAHC convened a number of meetings
to discuss the dom ain name problem. Various proposals were discussed and a
“rough consensus”  was achieved around what even tually became the MoU. Once
the MoU  was drafted, it was posted upon the Internet and companies with an
interest in the Internet were asked to “sign on.”  The  general idea was to gene rate
a certain  critical mass of acceptance and, at that poin t, seek implementation of the
MoU  by adding the top-level domains and permitting com peti tion among
registries.66 Although the proce ss took place outside the normal standard-setting
proce ss, it was in some ways analogous to the proce ss in that it sought to build  a
consensus and voluntary participation.67
The MoU  was even tually supplanted by a dom ain name proposal set forth in
January of 1998 by the U.S. Department  of Commerce under the guidance of Ira
Maga ziner—the so-called “Green Pap er.”68 Like the MoU, the Green Paper
proposed opening up registration services to competition and creating a number
of new top-level dom ain names.  However,  instead of an international body to
administer the dom ain name system, the Green Paper called for the creation of a
private, not-for -profit  corporation that wou ld essentia lly take on a number of the
coordination and policy-making functions prev iously in the hands of IANA and
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69. See id. at 8832.
70. More than 430 comments were submitted in response to the Green Paper. See
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741; John Borland, Domain
Name Plan Gathers Criticism (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/
domnam/TWB19980323S0029>.
71. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741.
72. See id. at 31,745-46.




76. See Amy Harmon, We the People of the Internet: Cybercitizens Debate How to Form
On-Line Union, Perfect or Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at D10; see also
International Forum on the White Paper (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.ifwp.org>.
77. See The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, IFWP/DNS Work-in-Progress (visited
Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ifwp>.
NSI.  Th is corporation would thus have the respo nsibility for distributing IP
addre sses, managing the dom ain name root direc tory, and overseeing the policies
for the creation of new top-level dom ains. The  corporation would be governed by
a board  of directors,  which would consist of representatives from a number of
different Internet “stakeholder” groups.  The  government wou ld retain some
background  oversight function until September 30, 2000, at which poin t, it wou ld
withdraw com pletely  from dom ain name governance.69  
After soliciting numerous public  com ments on the Green Paper,70 the
Commerce Depar tment issued in June of 1998 a final W hite Paper,71 which
contained many of the recommend ations set forth in the Green Paper,  though it
differed in a number of respects.  In particular, it left a number of issues regarding
the structure of the dom ain name system (e.g.,  the addition of new top-level
dom ains, the minimum qualifications for competing registrars) to the new not-for-
profit corporation and provided less in the way of substantive guidance.72 T he
basic  structure of the Department  of Commerce*s “policy statement”  remained
unchanged, however. The  coordination functions once fulfilled by IANA would
now be fulfilled by a “new, not-for-pro fit corporation formed by priva te sector
Internet stakeholde rs.”73 The  U.S. Governm ent would initially enter into an
agreement with this new organization, but wou ld even tually withdraw com pletely
from dom ain name governance by September 30, 2000, once the new arrangement
had become sufficiently stable.74
In response  to the W hite Paper*s call for an “invit[ation] to work together to
form a . . . corporation to manage DNS function s,”75 various interested Internet
groups met over the following months to try to  hammer out the structure and
shape of such a corporation.76 Mee tings were held  in Virginia, Geneva, and
Buenos Aires to discuss the recommend ations in the W hite Paper.77 At these
meetings, some areas of consensus emerged, though many questions were left
unresolved. 
Sho rtly before the September 30, 1998 deadline, however, IANA, through Jon
Postel, issued its own prop osal for a new, not-for -profit  dom ain name
organization, which it called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
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78. See ICANN: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (last updated
Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.ICANN.com>.
79. See, e.g., The Boston Group (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://pax.cavebear.com/bwg>;
Niall McKay, Critics Delay New Net Government (last updated Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www
.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15482.html>.
80. See Meet the ICANN Board (last updated Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/
news/politics/story/15499.html>.
81. See Niall McKay, Net Authority Passes to ICANN (last updated Oct. 20, 1998)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15718.html>; Niall McKay, ICANN Gets
Green Light (last updated Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/
story/16469.html>.
82. One of the perpetual challenges of writing in this area is dealing with the incredible
pace of change in the subject matter. Accordingly, some of the references here and elsewhere
in the Article reflect the particular state of events at the particular time at which the Article was
written. Despite the rapid pace of change, I feel it still worthwhile to draw what relatively
enduring lessons we can from these rapidly shifting circumstances, and risk being proven
wrong (or rendered irrelevant) perhaps sooner than in other, less rapidly changing areas.
83. Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
8826 (1998) (parenthetical in original).
Numb ers (“ICANN ”).78 The  proposal included bylaws and very specific
provisions regarding the powers of the corporation and the appointment of its
directors.  Although this proposal came under much criticism from other groups, 79
it quick ly became the leading proposal.  ICANN was subsequently incorporated,
the initial board  of directors was appointed,80 and in December 1998, after some
amendm ents to the bylaws in response  to numerous concern s, the Department  of
Commerce transferred dom ain name coordination functio ns to ICANN.81 As of
the t ime of this writing,82 ICANN is engaged, under close scrutiny by members
of the Internet com munity,  in fulfilling the functions laid out in the W hite Paper,
including, for example, considering how to open up registration services to
competition and whether and how to create  additional top-level dom ains. 
Unlike the MoU, implementation of the Green Paper*s and W hite Paper*s
recommend ations was not sought so much through a ground up consensus-
building procedure, although the comment  period after issuance of the Green
Paper was designed to gather input on the prop osals. Rather, the proposals were
implic itly backed by the autho rity of the U.S. Governm ent to implement changes
in the dom ain name system, either direc tly through legislation or through its
control of the NSF contract with NSI and the other coordinating bod ies. Thus, in
some ways, the W hite Paper moved away from the preexisting standard-se tting
model of Internet coordination. Th is Article  will later discuss whether these
moves were ultimately  succe ssful. In the mean time, however, it is worth  noting
that, desp ite this shift, the W hite Paper still drew heavily from the standard-
setting model and its underlying assumptions. First,  the proposal continued to
treat the dom ain name problem as primarily a technical problem: “[W]e  seek to
create  mechanisms to solve a few, primarily technical (albe it critical)  questions
about administration of Internet names and numb ers.”83 In addition, it conceived
of the solution to the problem mainly  as one of technical standard-setting: “In
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84. Id. at 8828.
85. See Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1388 (stating that “[e]xperience suggests that the
community of online users and service providers is up to the task of developing a self-
governance system” for domain names).
86. See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997)
(“[C]ode is political . . . . [T]he architectures that are established in cyberspace have normative
significance, and . . . choices can be made about the values that this architecture will embed.
. . . If code is political, then it is not the task of engineers alone. . . . If code constitutes
cyberspace, then citizens must choose the code.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code:
Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
181, 184 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution of Code] (“[T]hese are all policy choices
made by default by a structure of code that has developed—unaware at times, and, generally,
uncritically of the politics that code entails.”).
87. See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998);
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd.
v. Epix, Inc., No. 97-107-FR, 1997 WL 736486 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 1997); Juno Online Servs.,
L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Planned Parenthood v. Bucci, No.
97 Civ. 0629 (KMVV), 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d
Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision, Inc.
performing the functions listed above, the new corporation will act much like a
standard-setting bod y.”84
III. TH E NO N T E C H N IC A L NA T U R E O F DO M A I N NA M E
PR O BLE M S
As noted above, the problems surrounding the dom ain name system have, up
to now, largely  been framed as technical standard prob lems, and the processes
used to resolve these problems have acco rding ly been analogs to the technical
standard-setting proce sses.85 Th is approach,  however, fails to fully app reciate  the
fact that dom ain name problems are not pure ly technical prob lems, but pub lic
policy ones as well.  Spe cifically, the dom ain name controve rsy raises difficult
issues regarding the proper distribution of a limited resource (domain  names), the
allocation of autho rity to control such a resource, and the proper shape and
structure of the Internet as a whole. Such questions are “public” in nature, to the
extent that they affect all partic ipants  on the Internet and to the extent they
involve distribution of a quasi-pub lic resource. Mo reover, they cannot be
resolved solely by reference to a relatively  neutral technical performance metric;
in many cases, conflicting value judgments may be irreconcilable.86 Do main  name
problems are thus, in a number of ways, fundamentally unlike other technical
standard prob lems.
A. The Conflict with  Trade mark Law
The most  visible  aspect of the dom ain name problem has been the tension
between trademark law and dom ain name registration. Th is tension has been
made visible  by a host of well-publicized lawsuits  between trademark owners and
the holders of domain names corresponding to their tradema rks.87 In the most
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v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group,
Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (discussing dispute
between Hasbro and IEG over candyland.com); MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (analyzing dispute between MTV and former V.J. Adam Curry over
mtv.com); Ray V. Hartwell, III & Stephen P. Demm, Courts Unclear Whether Internet Names
Infringe, NAT*L L.J., May 8, 1995, at C37 (discussing dispute between Stanley Kaplan and
Princeton Review over ownership of kaplan.com); Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right
Now, There Are No Rules to Keep You from Owning a Bitchin* Corporate Name as Your Own
Internet Address, WIRED, Oct. 1994, at 50, 54 (describing author*s registration of
mcdonalds.com).
88. See, e.g., Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int*l, Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434 RPA/PVT,
1996 WL 887734 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Astro-Med, Inc., No.
C-95-20602-JW, 1996 WL 36910039 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1996).
89. See generally Albert, supra note 57; Alexander Gigante, “Domain-ia”: The Growing
Tension Between the Domain Name System and Trademark Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET, supra note 1, at 135; Neal J. Friedman & Kevin Siebert, The Name Is Not Always
the Same, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631 (1997); Deborah Howitt, War.Com: Why the Battles
Over Domain Names Will Never Cease, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 719 (1997); Michael
Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of “www.Trademark.Com”: The Application of
Principles of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455
(1997); David J. Loundy, A Primer on Trademark Law and Internet Addresses, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 465 (1997); David W. Maher, Trademark Law on the
Internet–Will it Scale? The Challenge to Develop International Trademark Law, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 3 (1997); Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, the Internet,
and Trademarks: Infringement in Cyberspace, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER  & HIGH TECH. L.J.
137 (1997); Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law
of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v1i1/
burk.html>; Kenneth Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark
Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996); Danielle Weinberg
Swartz, Comment, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (1998); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name
Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other
Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 911 (1997); Milton Mueller, Trademarks and Domain Names:
Property Rights and Institutional Evolution in Cyberspace (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/study.html>.
90. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *3-10; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1234-
41; Panavision, 945 F. Supp at 1301-04.
notorious cases, domain name “squatters” registered doma in names corresponding
to famous trademarks and sought to sell the dom ain names at a pro fit to the
trademark owners.  In other cases, disputes have arisen between parties each
having a colo rable  trademark-based claim to a given dom ain name.88 Numero us
articles have been written addressing the tension between trademark law and
dom ain name registration.89
Although this is the most  visible  aspect of the problem, it is, if considered in
isolation, in some ways the least troubling. The  courts have begun the proce ss of
sorting through the trademark implications of dom ain names.  In some cases,
dom ain names have been transferred to the trademark owners,  under theories of
likelihood of confusion or trademark dilution.90 In other cases, the parties have
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91. Note that a number of these settlements may have more to do with the relative economic
strengths of the parties involved, rather than the strength of the underlying trademark claim.
92. See Nathenson, supra note 89, at 954.
93. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 695, 697 (1998).
94. Moreover some, at least, have argued that the use of domain names as de facto
directories will be displaced with the development of fully functioning Internet directories. See
Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 264-66, 269. Indeed, even today, it is relatively easy to find
a given entity’s domain name by using existing search engines. See Oppedahl, supra note 16,
at 170 (“It is a trivial matter to plug in the company name with any search engine and very
quickly to find the company*s Web site.”).
settled, with the trademark gene rally going to the party  with the trademark right.91
The legal system is gradually effecting a rough acco mmoda tion between
trademark law and the dom ain name registration system. To be sure, the proce ss
is slow and costly.  However,  as decisions become more widely publicized,
lit igation shou ld decrea se as the rights  of trademark holders are more clearly
established.
The  one area of potentially serious conflict involves the geographic and subject
matter scope of dom ain names. W hereas trademark law perm its some limited
concurrent use of the same trademark (in different geographic areas or with
different produc ts and services), the domain name system, as it is currently
structured, perm its no concurrent use, s ince dom ain names are both  unique and
ope rate worldwide.92 Thus, for example, a pizza shop in New Haven and a pizza
shop in Sea ttle can both  be called “Broadway Pizza.” Similar ly, both  Apple
Records and Apple Computer can share the same “Apple” mark. There  can be,
however, only one apple.com.
Although this inconsistency prese nts some tension, it is certain ly not
unreso lvable  by the courts.93 The  courts, in applying traditional trademark
principles,  may resolve this tension in any one of a number of different ways. The
courts (1) might require the registration of different types of marks (e.g.,
applecomputer.com and applerecords.com); (2) cou ld award the dom ain name to
neither party,  in order to reduce consumer confusion; (3) cou ld award the dom ain
name to the party  that first registered it with NSI,  or that first registered it
federally. If the courts fail to set clear standards,  Cong ress can step in to clarify
the rights of the respective parties. In short,  numerous options exist.  Tradem ark
law can be adapted to fit the new medium of the Interne t.94
B. Allocation Problems
Although the existing lit igation concerning trademarks is, by itself, not an
unreso lvable  problem, it poin ts to deeper underlying problems with the dom ain
name allocation system as a whole. NS I’s current proce ss of allocating dom ain
names is essentia lly first-come, first-served. Thus, anyone can register any
dom ain name, as long as it has not already been taken. In the wake of the above-
mentioned lawsuits  (into which NSI was often dragged), NSI refined this proce ss
to include provisions dealing with trademark claims. Thus, NSI will now suspend
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95. See Network Solutions’ Domain Name Dispute Policy (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://www.internic.net/faq/dispute.html>; see also NSI Flawed Domain Name Policy
Information Page (visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://www.patents.com/nsi.sht> (web site of
Oppedahl & Larson, L.L.P.). 
96. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 160-66.
97. See Gigante, supra note 89, at 139-41; Maher, supra note 34; Oppedahl, supra note 16,
at 158-66; Shaw, supra note 21, at 115-18.
98. Some (e.g., NSI) have argued that the supply of domain names is in fact not scarce,
pointing to the fact that the 22 open spaces to the left of “.com” can be filled with 37 different
characters or symbols, leading to 37 to the 22nd power in domain names. See NSI, Internet
Domain Name System: Myths and Facts (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.netsol.com/policy/
MYTHS4.html>. In fact, the domain name space is much more limited than that, since it is
practically constrained by the number of meaningful combinations of letters, as well as by
trademark law. To McDonalds, for example, only one domain name will do.
99. See William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987). A situation analogous to the present one took place in the early
years of the trademark registration system. In 1965, Robert Aries registered over 100 valuable
U.S. trademarks (e.g., Pan American, NBC, Texaco, Monsanto) and forced the companies to
buy the marks from him. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 559-60; Gerald O*Brien, The
Madrid Agreement Adherence Question, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 326, 328 (1966).
100. See Joshua Quittner, Life in Cyberspace: You Deserve a Break Today, NEWSDAY, Oct.
7, 1994, at A05, available in 1994 WL 7444048 (“[Domain name registration] is like a gold
rush: Two thousand requests a month are coming in to stake claim to a name on the Internet,
nearly 10 times as many as a year ago.”); see also BestDomains (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://www.bestdomains.com>; DomainMart: Your Marketplace for Internet Estates &
Businesses (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.domainmart.com>.
operation of a dom ain name under certain  circumstances, if presented with
evidence of valid  trademark registration held  by another party. 95
Litigation has highlighted flaws with the first-come, first-served allocation
proce ss. Most obv iously,  the existence of trademark lit igation poin ts to the fact
that the allocation proce ss fails to adequa tely account for trademark rights ex
ante, thus leading to costly redistribution efforts  ex pos t. NSI*s attemp ts to deal
with these conflicts have been designed with an eye toward keeping NSI out of
lit igation rather than toward any larger policy goa l.96 Substantial concerns have
been raised over NSI*s power to suspend operation of potentially extremely
valuab le dom ain names,  with the only recourse  being the courts. NSI*s policies
have, by and large, satisfied no one.97
Even more fundamentally, and largely overlooked in the focus on trademark
related prob lems, the first-come, first-served allocation proce ss is an extrem ely
inefficient way to alloca te a limited resource98 such as dom ain names.  Like any
pure registration system, the dom ain name allocation proce ss gives rise to
wasteful “rent seeking” and “gold  rushes,”  as parties com pete  to lock up
potentially valuab le dom ain names,  without any thought of productive use.99
Indeed, dom ain name brokers have already registered many names that they
believe will be valuab le in the future.100 Thus, there may be reasons to believe that
more rational allocat ion systems may be possible, certain ly with respect to
trademark rights and possibly with respect to dom ain names in gene ral. For
example, one cou ld well imagine that “ownership” of a dom ain name might be
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101. Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 60, pt. I, § 2.a.
Indeed, the creation and development of Internet protocols is to some extent government
funded. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 21, 22, 24. That is one reason why they are
available to the public, and not owned by any single entity.
102. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 158-66 (documenting the various changes in NSI*s
trademark dispute policy).
103. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,746
(1998); Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 164-66.
104. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 260-61.
105. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 158; Shaw, supra note 21, at 115-16 (roughly
estimating the revenues that NSI has received from domain name registration).
limited in duration, subject to forfeiture, dependent  upon certain  conditions of
ownership, and so on.
These issues, regarding the proper allocation of dom ain names,  are not
technic al, but political in nature in that they involve competing value claims and
competing claims of right. The  dom ain name space is, in many ways, a limited
pub lic resource, as many of the dom ain name proposals seemed to recognize. The
gTLD MoU, for example, expressly stated that “the Internet Top Level Do main
(TLD) name space is a pub lic resource and is subject to the pub lic trust.”101 Much
of its value arises from the participation of “netizen s,” not through the efforts  of
NSI.  Furthermore, the gove rnment, through the NSF and the DARPA, has been
involved in the development  and funding of Internet pro toco ls and infrastructure.
The  dom ain name space, as one of the consequences of such government
sponsored development, is thus, in many ways, a pub lic resource.
The  proper distribution of such a resource is a pub lic policy question, not a
pure ly technical one. There  are numerous ways in which a l imited resource can
be distributed. For example, trademark law distributes trademarks based on a
number of requirements, including the productive and continuing use of a mark.
It also has rules for resolving disputes over marks.  The  current dom ain name
allocation system, by con trast, includes almost  none of these wider
considera tions. Indeed, it seems designed solely for the purpo se of trying to keep
NSI from being dragged into litigation.102 Yet one cou ld well imagine that a
broader view might be warranted.
C. Au thority  Problems
Apart from NSI*s policies in allocating dom ain names,  serious questions have
also been raised regarding NSI*s autho rity to alloca te such names in the first
place. NSI*s actions in suspending certain  domains in light of trademark claims
have led many to question the source of NSI*s autho rity to do so, without any
recourse  except the courts.103 These questions were also raised when NSI began
to charge a fee for registering domain names. 104 The  idea of a pure ly priva te
company having mon opo ly control over, and charging for, distribution of a quasi-
pub lic resource is disturbing.105
NSI*s autho rity to register dom ain names was ostensibly derived from its
“cooperative agree ment” with the NSF, which delegated the autho rity to NSI in
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106. See NSF Cooperative Agreement, supra note 20, at art. 7.
107. See Cukier, supra note 67 (“NSI says it owns all the intellectual property rights to the
database containing the domain names ending in .com. In theory it says it could carry on
issuing .com addresses irrespective of any proposal . . . from the IAHC.”).
108. See generally Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 23-24 (discussing potential problems
with IP address allocation).
109. Indeed, the decision about who, in a given country, is the proper manager of that
country*s domain name space is a question fraught with value judgments. See Shaw, supra note
21, at 111-13. Until recently, Jon Postel had largely given the registration right to whomever
applied first. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 26. Should a dispute arise, however, it is
unclear what the lines of authority should be.
110. See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258-61 (discussing the broader
implications of the government*s withdrawal of funding from many of the existing standard-
setting institutions, such as IANA and the IETF, and the need for the Internet to develop self-
sustaining institutions).
1993.106 That con tract,  however, origina lly was scheduled to run out in September
of 1998. Prior to the issuance of the W hite Paper,  NSI had asserted ownership
over the dom ain name database, and had indicated that it intended to continue to
register dom ain names, 107 giving rise to substantial concern about whether the rest
of the Internet com munity  wou ld continue to recognize its autho rity to do so (or
whether it wou ld choose to recognize an alternative autho rity, such as the gTLD
Mo U). These concerns have since been eased somewhat by the more active recent
involvement of the Department  of Commerce in ensuring a “transition” to priva te
management of the dom ain name system by ICANN. However,  the W hite Paper
itself raises a number of issues concerning autho rity, which will be discussed in
more detail  below.
No te that similar autho rity questions also existed for IANA, as well. IP
addresses are also a limited resource.108 Allocation of “blocks”  of such addresses
to regional Internet providers was for some t ime done in a largely  informal
manner by Jon Postel (and has since been transferred to ICAN N). As demand  for
larger and larger blocks of IP addresses increases, increasing scrutiny will be
given to allocation proce sses. These processes also have an element of value
judgment to them.109 W hile Jon Postel*s sound judgment and reputation in the
Internet com munity  had for some t ime led few to criticize his actions, newer
entran ts into the Internet may well have differing views.110
This question, who should have the right to con trol, and indeed pro fit from,
allocation of a l imited Internet resource, is far from a pure ly technical one.
Indeed, it is fundamentally a pub lic policy question, involving questions of value
and competing claims of right. Existing stakeholde rs, for example, NSI,  IANA,
dom ain name owners,  and consum ers, have an interest in the resolution of this
question, and changes to the allocation proce ss will have a direct impact on them.
No objective metric  can be appealed to in order to resolve this issue.
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111. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 8 (acknowledging the “political decisions” that went
into the choice of the current top-level domains); see also W. Lazear, RFC 1031: Milnet Name
Domain Transition (Nov. 1987) (last modified Dec. 19, 1998) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/
rfc1031.html>; J. Postel & J. Reynolds, RFC 920: Domain Requirements (Oct. 1984) (last
modified Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc920.html>. Indeed, the fact that the
generic top-level domains are effectively controlled by the United States has political
overtones.
112. See Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1409-11. One example of the literally
political nature of Internet zoning was presented when Zaire was renamed Congo, and applied
to IANA for a change in its top-level domain. See Jos van Geffen, Changes in Domain List (last
modified June 23, 1997) <http://tnj.phys.tue.nl/stats/getstts/fomains.html>.
D. Structural Problems
Some early proposals concerning the dom ain name system advocated changes
in the structure of dom ain names,  and these too raise difficult policy questions.
As mentioned above, some proposals have called for changes to the dom ain
names themselves,  in order to deal with the concurrent use problem presented by
trademark law. Thus, dom ain name space might look like “mcdonalds.fastfood.
us.com.” Yet questions concerning the structure of dom ain names are clearly
based fundamentally on value, not technical standards. 111 Should dom ain names
conform to trademark law? How does this shape our perception of the Interne t?
How shou ld the Internet be zoned?112
Mo reover, any changes to the existing dom ain name structure wou ld inevitab ly
have real-wo rld financial impa cts on the owners of existing dom ain names.
Companies have invested quite  substantial sums of money promoting their
dom ain names.  Users have come to rely on existing dom ain names.  Consideration
and weighing of such impa cts involve questions of value and competing claims
of right, not technical performance. How are such claims to be resolved? As
shou ld be clear, these questions cannot be resolved with reference to a technical
performance metric. Instead, they involve competing value claims, which must
be resolved through some kind of legitimate  proce ss, one that adequa tely takes
into account the interests  of the many different stakeholde rs.
IV. TH E IN A D E Q U A C Y  O F T H E ST A N D A R D -SE T TIN G
PROCESS  O F CO O R D IN A T IO N
Because the problems raised by dom ain names possess  this fundamentally
value-based and interest-based character, the consensus-based technical standard-
setting proce ss cannot resolve the dom ain name problems in a satisfactory
manner. In the dom ain name con text, the various assumptions that unde rlie the
standard-setting approach no longer hold  true. “Rough consensus” is not likely
to be poss ible where the universe of stakeholders is diverse and competing
econom ic interests  are at stake. The  result is that the technical standard-setting
proce ss, to the extent it fails to include all stakeholde rs, will face (and indeed
already has faced) serious legitimacy prob lems. Absent true consensus among
relevant stakeholde rs, it is difficult to see how those who have de facto control
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113. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 29 (“The IETF process has produced many
proposals for change, but few (if any) have been implemented because of the perceived need
for consensus, which is highly valued but notoriously slow to achieve.”) (parenthetical in
original).
114. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258 (arguing that “we can no longer rely on this
protected environment to shelter [the Internet*s] existence and preserve its cultural ethic”).
115. See A.M. Rutkowski, Internet Domain Names and Other Identifiers: A Roadmap
Among Issues and Initiatives (last modified Nov. 20, 1996) <http://www.wia.org/pub/
identifiers/issues-roadmap.html>.
[F]or a variety of reasons, it is the business community that presently is least able
to participate in ongoing forums dealing with these issues. Few people in the
corporate or public policy worlds are familiar with, or would participate in, the
kind of forums traditionally used by the Internet community for collaboration and
decision making—which are fine tuned for working technical level and research
and academic participation.
Id.
116. See Tony Rutkowski, Parties of Interest in Internet Public Policy Matters (last modified
Apr. 5, 1998) <http://www.wia.org/pub/policy-orgs.html> (listing parties with an interest in
the domain name issue); Shaw, supra note 21, at 124 (“Who are the parties that should be
consulted on the evolution of international Internet name space? Certainly many more than are
currently involved.”).
117. Indeed, the acceptance and incorporation of new voices presents a challenge to the
existing standard-setting process. Given that the Internet is largely controlled by a rather small
community with a strong, established culture, how easily does this community incorporate new
voices with values markedly different from their own?
over the Internet have a legitimate  claim to impose  standards that adversely affect
the interests  of others. As a direct result  of such legitimacy prob lems, the proce ss
will no longer be able  to rely upon the informal agree ments that coordinated the
Internet in place of any central autho rity. Although the recent implementation of
the W hite Paper*s proposals through ICANN goes further than earlier proposals
in recognizing the value-based nature of the problem, it does not go far enough.
A. The Failure  of Standard-Setting Assumptions
The assumptions that unde rlie the standard-setting proce ss no longer hold  true
in the dom ain name con text. First,  “rough consensus”  is not a realistic
possibility.113 The  relevant norms are no longer the relatively  convergent norms
of a close com munity  of engineers.  Instead, the relevant communi ty of
stakeholders now includes current dom ain name holders,  who have a considera ble
interest in any proposals for reform.114 Bo th Yahoo.com and Amazon.com have
spent considera ble sums promoting their dom ain names and have strong financial
interests  in the structure and continuing management of the dom ain name
system.115 Similar ly, Internet users now have a direct interest as well.116 The
structure of the dom ain name system has a direct impact on their experience as
browsers of the W orld Wide  W eb and as senders and receivers of e-mail.
W hereas before, these parties had little interest in the obscure, and largely
invisible, technical standards,  they now have a direct interest in the future shape
of the dom ain name system.117 The  dramatic expansion of the interested parties
means that true consensus will be difficult to achieve.
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118. This illustrates the important general point that conditions that existed in the past may
no longer exist today or in the future. The Internet of today presents a different coordination
challenge than the Internet of the past.
119. I thus tend to disagree with Johnson and Post about the “voluntary” nature of
participation in Internet standards. See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 74 (“The rules instead
evolved from the decentralized decisions by individuals to adopt a promising standard because
it served their own interests.”). Because of strong network effects, computers participate
“voluntarily” only because the Internet is the only game in town. Johnson and Post
acknowledge this point later in their article, see id. at 75, but this acknowledgment would seem
to undercut the legitimacy of the common standard, to the extent it rests on any ideas of
voluntary participation.
120. See generally Lessig, Path of Cyberlaw, supra note 4 (discussing how code regulates
behavior); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired
Censors (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault
.htm>; Krol & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 4-5 (analogizing Internet standard-setting to the
doctrines of a church). “If you go to a church and accept its teachings and philosophy, you are
accepted by it, and receive the benefits. If you don*t like it, you can leave. The church is still
there, and you get none of the benefits. Such is the Internet.” Id. at 5.
121. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 421-22 (“When DARPA and later the NSF controlled
the Internet, these sponsoring agencies provided the necessary authority for the ad hoc groups
to allocate among themselves jurisdiction over the various operational aspects of the federal
government*s computer network.”) (each emphasis in original).
The  fact that value-choices are involved also indicates that decisions are no
longer read ily measured against any single metric. Technical standards can be
measured against a performance metric. However,  decisions regarding the
structure of dom ain name space, or the relative autho rity that various parties
shou ld have in allocating dom ain names,  are not pure ly technical questions and
cannot be measured against a performance metric. Indeed, there may be no single
solution that is identifiab ly “optimal”; many different structures may be quite
possible. Mo reover, different structures will have differing impa cts on the various
parties involved. Under such circumstances, claims of expertise are not read ily
acknowledged, much less deferred to.
Furthermore, the scale  and pop ularity of the Internet today suggest that exit
from the system is no longer a realistic  possibility, and that “volun tary”
compliance with existing standards is no longer so volun tary.118 In the past,  the
legitimacy of Internet technical standards was based, in part,  on the idea that
compliance was entirely volun tary. W hile in theory, individual computers on the
Internet can choose to follow a different dom ain name autho rity, in prac tice,
powerful network effects  bind all of the computers on the Internet onto  the
current system.119 Opposition to the current network will be extrem ely difficult,
given the distributed nature of the Interne t. Unless  such opposition results in a
cred ible alternative to the current network, parties will be bound  together in a
kind of “tyranny of the netwo rk.”120 The  difficulty of collective action in a
distributed network means that the few poin ts of central control wield a
dispropo rtionate  amount of power.
Finally,  neutral and trusted institutions may be few and far between where
dom ain names are concerned. It is no coincidence that the questioning of NSI*s
autho rity became particularly acute  as the NSF began to withdraw its seal of
app rova l.121 The  NSF*s presence in the background  had served as a potential
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122. I address in this Part the earlier proposals to reform the domain name system. The more
recent attempts currently being implemented I discuss infra Part IV.C.
123. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743
(1998); Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 32-33. 
But it is fantasy to suggest that authority for the domain name appeals process
will be perceived as legitimate if it is assigned to IANA in its present incarnation,
the Internet Society (ISOC), or the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). The
stakeholder community for domain name assignments is the whole world, and
none of these organizations comes close to being representative.
Id. at 32.
124. See OIC Annotated Version of the gTLD-MoU (last modified June 11, 1997) <http://
www.interactivehq.org/oic/html2/anngtld.htm> (questioning, at times quite vociferously, the
IAHC*s authority to speak for the Internet community as a whole).
125. See Cukier, supra note 107 (noting that the IAHC “has been buffeted by international
criticism both of its controversial plan and of its consultative process”).
126. Even without inclusion of all of these points of view, rough consensus among the
smaller group of Internet insiders may still be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve, as indicated by the current status of many domain name proposals.
public-interest check on the activities of NSI in the registration proce ss. (Indeed,
the rosy view of consensus building prevalent in the technical standards
coordination proce ss may,  in part,  be illusory,  to the extent that this background
government presence served as a basis  for adherence to the technical standards.)
As that presence recedes,  concerns have arisen over NSI*s role  as a priva te
institution entrusted with management of a l imited, quasi-pub lic resource.
Maintenance of pure ly technical standards is primarily an administrative task,
involving com para tively less value judgment. The  important thing is not who
holds the information, but that someone  holds the information. In the dom ain
name con text, however, registration of dom ain names is not a pure ly neutral
ministerial task, and the identity of the registrar matters.
B. Implications for the Standard-Setting Approach
The inapplicability  of the above assumptions means that any attempt to
implement change through a pure standard-setting proce ss, as earlier proposals
had attempted, faces several problems.122 First,  the existing technical standard-
setting process faces serious legitimacy problems when applied to the dom ain
name problem. Any solution arrived at, whether by the IETF or by parties outside,
that is, through the MoU  or between IANA and NSI,  does not truly represent a
“rough consensus”  among all  of the relevant stakeholde rs. For example, the MoU
was drafted by many of the same parties that partic ipate  currently in Internet
governance. Other interested parties, such as content providers, Internet service
providers, marketers,  et cetera, were not fully represented.123 Similar ly, the wider
population of users of the Internet had no effective voice in the proce ss.124
Although various pub lic interest groups did  comment  upon the MoU, it is difficult
to say to what extent these groups accu rately reflect the beliefs  of the wider
population of users, absent any formal mechanism for preference aggregation.125
To the extent that “rough consensus”  is achieved through the existing standard-
setting proce ss without input from these parties,126 standards based on such
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127. See Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1410 (“Engineers write the code; the
code defines the architectures, and the architectures define what is possible within a certain
social space. No process of democracy defines this social space, save if the market is a process
of democracy.”).
128. See Dialogue, supra note 50; Shaw, supra note 21, at 124 (“The Internet has become
far too commercial and strategically important as a global communications tool to simply
perpetuate the same informal arrangements that have kept it glued together until now.”).
129. But see Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1389-91 (advancing a positive view of Internet
democracy).
130. Indeed, voice may be particularly difficult for newcomers who hold values that differ
markedly from those held by the dominant Internet community. Thus, for example, parties with
primarily commercial interests may have a more difficult time getting their interests seriously
considered.
131. Given that domain name governance raises complex, nontechnical policy questions,
there may be reasons to believe that the lack of full participation may have resulted in a
substantively less-than-optimal result.
132. Indeed, as Gigante points out, to the extent that these groups act together in concerted
fashion, their coordination of the Internet may raise antitrust concerns. See Gigante, supra note
11, at 430; see also Goldfoot, supra note 11, at 909.
133. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743 (1998)
(detailing the failed attempts by the engineering community to achieve consensus).
consensus represent little more than the preferences of a mino rity of Internet
participants.127 Before consensus can legitimately be reached and subsequently
invoked to justify a particular action, the relevant stakeholders must all have been
consulted. W ithout such an inclusive sweep, reliance on industry “self-regulation”
begs the question of who is the “self” doing the regulating. In a world  of
competing value judgments, the rejection of “voting” in David Clark*s description
of the technical standards formation proce ss is troubling.128 W here policy issues
are involved, voting may be the only viable  option.
Indeed, in many ways, the pure technical standard-setting proce ss, at least as
applied to the dom ain name problem, is rather undemocratic.129 Instead of seeking
out,  through some more formal proce ss, the preferences of all of the relevant
stakeholders in the dom ain name debate, the standard-setting proce ss relies on
rough consensus among a more limited range of participants, who may or may not
accu rately  represent all of the interests  on the Interne t. There  is little room for
voice.130 The  very distributed nature that makes the Internet so difficult to govern,
in turn, makes it difficult to organize any resistance to the few centralized poin ts
of con trol. It may be that the existing partic ipants  have arrived at an obj ectively
good solution to the problem.131 However,  there is at least a feeling of being
governed by a group of (benevo lent, to be sure) platonic guardians. 132
At the same time, any conscientious attempt to include the universe of relevant
stakeholders will likely result,  for the above reasons,  in an inability to come to
any consensus at all. Even within the engineering com munity , consensus on the
dom ain name problem has been difficult to achieve.133 W hen the views of a
broader segment of the population are taken into acco unt, consensus will likely
be impossible. Mo reover, even aggregating such preferences wou ld be logistically
quite  difficult.  The  practical functioning of the current standard-setting proce ss
(e.g., open meetings, working groups)  assumes a relatively  limited set of
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134. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 32 (“Authority can only be readily exercised if
it is perceived as legitimate by all stakeholders.”).
135. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 428 (“[T]he private sector*s acquiescence is critical to
the IAHC*s assumption of the role of overall Internet governing body. However, such
acquiescence is unlikely where the IAHC system threatens fundamental rights.”).
136. Johnson, supra note 23.
137. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 172 (“NSI, the holder of a position of public trust
regarding nearly all of the domain names on the Internet, cannot be permitted to continue to
develop its policies with no meaningful stakeholder involvement.”).
138. See Johnson, supra note 23.
139. This is true, at least domestically. International interests have been more critical of the
U.S. Government’s role in domain name coordination.  See infra text accompanying notes 147,
168-70; see also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1001
(1994); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-561 (Supp. II 1996) (seeking
participants. Even in the pure ly technical standard-setting area, this model has
become increa singly stretched as the Internet has become more and more
prominen t. It wou ld be stretched well past the breaking point if it truly tried to
accommodate all of the stakeholders in the dom ain name problem. The  New
England town meeting does not function so well on a national (much less
interna tional)  scale.
The  existing standard-setting proce ss*s lack of legitimacy highlights  another
related problem, the lack of actual autho rity to compel adoption of changes.134
Formal legal autho rity has been unnecessary in the consensus-based realm  of
technical standards,  as these standards are largely  value-neutral and the proce ss
of arriving at them has been considered legitimate. In the dom ain name con text,
however, the lack of clear legitimacy in any of the com peting processes means
that voluntary coordination is substantially in dou bt.135 The  lack of formal
autho rity becomes extrem ely problematic, as no given entity can guarantee the
implementation of a given standard, even if one were established. The  result is
a “policy vacuum.” 136 No institutions can effectively serve as fora within which
to resolve the numerous policy issues presented by the dom ain name issue. Any
attemp ts by spec ific parties to engage in policy making are met with stiff
resistance, as in the case of both  NSI137 and the IAHC. The  authoritative bodies
are thus reduced to suggesting only incremental improvements (e.g.,  IAHC*s
MoU) or clinging to arid, policy-neutral processes (e.g.,  NSI*s first-come, first-
served allocation process).138 Larger policy issues rema in unaddressed.
C. A Partial Solution: The Wh ite Paper and ICANN
In many ways the involvement of the Department  of Commerce, its spec ific
proposals in the W hite Paper,  and the current implementation of these proposals
through ICANN can be seen as an implic it recognition of, and response  to, the
above failure of the standard-setting approach to achieve a sustainable and
legitimate  “rough consensus”  about the future of the dom ain name system. It
addresses the problem of lack of autho rity by wielding the background  threat of
more intrusive government action in this area, as well as its control over the
contract with NSI and other coordinating Internet bod ies. There  is little doubt that
the government has the ultimate  autho rity to legislate  a result  in this area.139 It
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to regulate the architecture of the Internet).
140. The Green Paper itself recognizes that there are “substantial differences among Internet
stakeholders on how the domain name system should evolve.” Improvement of Technical
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8827 (1998) (to be codified
at 15 C.F.R. ch. XXIII) (proposed Feb. 20, 1998).
141. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,744
(1998). 
addresses the problem of lack of legitimacy by publishing its proposal and
soliciting com ments from the pub lic at large, from literally nearly  anyone who
wishes to com ment. In this way, the draft  Green Paper and subsequent discussion
of the W hite Paper provided a truly public  forum for the consideration of
differing views about the future of the dom ain name system.
At the same time, however, the spec ific proposals advanced in the W hite Paper
and their implementation in ICANN fail to satisfy both  of these requ irements of
authority and legitimac y, and do not go far enough in recognizing the polic y
aspects of the domain name problem. Spe cifically, rather than addressing the
difficult substantive policy problems concerning the dom ain name system, the
W hite Paper vests  autho rity over such issues in a private, not-for -profit
corporation, ICANN. In some ways, this solution is an improvement over the
status quo. Because ICA NN ’s board  of directors consists of members  of various
Internet stakeholder groups,  decisions by the corporation would be more
representative than decisions by an unaccountable  individual (even one as well-
regarded as Jon Postel) or an unaccountable  private  corporation (such as NSI).
Thus, ICANN at least establishs some sort of quasi-representative proce ss
through which conflicting policy claims cou ld be resolved.140 Mo reover, the
decisionmaking proce ss is centralized, formalized, and derives some level of
autho rity from the background  approval of the federal gove rnment. Finally,  as the
W hite Paper itself poin ts out,  priva te management will likely be more responsive
than government to changes in technology and the market.141
By vesting policy-making autho rity in a priva te corporation and eventually
moving toward com plete  government withdrawal,  however, the W hite Paper fails
to put completely  to rest questions of autho rity and legitimac y. Most generally,
why shou ld questions of dom ain name policy be placed in the hands of a pure ly
priva te entity, even one that is somewhat more representative of the interests  of
many current Internet stakeholde rs? Although basic  coordination functions (e.g.,
maintenance of the root direc tory)  might usefully be managed by such an entity
(through contract with the government), broader questions about the structure of
the dom ain name system (e.g.,  the shape and number of additional top-level
domains) do not seem legitimate ly settled in this fashion. W hat will guarantee
that this priva te corporation will adequa tely represent the interests  of the Internet
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142. The White Paper limits its prescriptions on this score to suggestions such as: “The new
corporation should operate as a private entity for the benefit of the community as a whole,”
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,749, or, “The organization
and its board should derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders,” id. at
31,750. The White Paper studiously avoids, however, the difficult details.
143. Once again, the White Paper declines to grapple with any of the tricky details, instead
simply noting that “the new corporation*s charter should provide a mechanism whereby its
governing body will evolve to reflect challenges in the constituency of Internet stakeholders.”
Id. at 31,750. Indeed, as of the time of this writing, ICANN has begun to seek to transform
itself into a membership-based organization in an effort to address precisely these concerns.
144. The White Paper subsequently backed away from such specifics. See id. at 31,745.
145. See IANA Draft Bylaws—Fifth Iteration (last updated Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.
iana.org/bylaws5.html>.
146. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,745 (“Most of
those who criticized the proposed allocation of Board seats called for increased representation
of their particular interest group on the Board of Directors.”); see also Elinor Mills, Complaints
Prompt Fifth Draft of Domain Name Plan (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.infoworld.com/
cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?980930.eidomain.htm> (explaining that domain name plans lack
consensus).
147. Much criticism has also legitimately been directed by international corporations and
governments at the exclusively U.S. focus of the Green Paper’s and White Paper*s proposals.
See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,748; Douglas Hayward,
Europeans Disappointed by Net Names Plan (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/
wire/story/domnam/TWB19980130S0009>.
com munity  as a whole?142 How will it account for changes in the make-up of that
com munity? 143
Mo re spec ifically, if this priva te corporation has control over Internet policy
decisions,  then questions of legitimacy will inevitab ly revolve around the make-
up of the corporation*s board  of directors and its proce dures.  The  Green Paper
origina lly proposed that three seats  be given to IP number registries, two seats  to
dom ain name registries, two seats  to representatives of the technical com munity,
and seven seats  to representatives of Internet users in gene ral, both  commercial
and nonc omm ercial. 144 The  spec ific proposal even tually implemented in ICANN
included a different distribution.145 Predictab ly, much criticism has arisen over
these distributions, as spec ific interest groups seek to obta in greater
representation.146 After all, if true consensus is not likely, then the composition
of the board  takes on much significance.147
The W hite Paper*s implementation of its substantive proposal through ICANN
thus represents  an awkward combination of a standard-setting and representation-
based approach to dom ain name coordination. It recognizes that differing interest
groups may have very different views concerning the future of the dom ain name
system, and that rough consensus may not be achie vab le. Accord ingly, it seeks
to construct a proce ss through which various interests  may be accommodated and
differing views may be resolved. At the same time, however, it attemp ts to place
this proce ss in a pure ly priva te con text, within the structure of a not-for-pro fit
corporation, and anticipates com plete  government withdrawal from dom ain name
coordination by the year 2000. Th is latter approach indicates a continuing
unde rlying adherence to the idea that the dom ain name problem is primarily a
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148. Indeed, shortly after being appointed, the directors of ICANN scheduled numerous
open meetings at various locations around the world in an effort to build trust among the
Internet community.
149. In response to the initial RFC, the Department of Commerce received more than 430
comments totaling some 1500 pages. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. at 31,741. In response to its Green Paper, the Department of Commerce received
more than 650 comments. See id. The RFCs, the Green Paper, and the submitted comments are
available at National Telecommunications & Information Administration (last modified Jan.
4, 1999) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov>.
technical standards problem best left to resolution by priva te industry,  rather than
through pub lic coordination.148
Ironically, the very deb ate (bo th in general and in the comments submitted in
response  to the Green Paper)  over the W hite Paper*s proposals revea ls the
inherent limits of the W hite Paper*s substantive prop osals. By setting forth the
proposal for com ment, the Department  of Commerce provided a valuab le forum
in which the wide variety of current Internet stakeholders had a voice.149
Mo reover, the government*s involvement in creating the forum lent it a certain
degree of legitimac y, and few appear to dispu te the government*s ultimate
autho rity in this area. Yet the very brea dth of the com ments revea ls the limits of
the W hite Paper*s approach,  in funneling the discussion over the future of the
dom ain name system artificially through a quasi-representative, priva te
corporation*s board  of directors.  The  proposal satisfies the coordination function,
but does not fully addre ss (although it does somewhat ameliorate) the underlying
and more fundamental legitimacy and autho rity prob lems. The  scope of the
response  to the proposal revea ls the difficulties in returning to a consensus-based
view of priva te standards-coordination.
V. ES T AB LIS H IN G AUTHORITY A N D LE G IT IM A C Y  F O R
DO M A I N NA M E CO O R D IN A T IO N
The above analysis  suggests that the fundamental problems that dog the dom ain
name system, lack of legitimacy and autho rity, will not be resolved without some
rethinking of the dom ain name coordination proce ss. A number of possible
options present themselves.  One would be to elimina te the awkward confluence
of technical standards and substa ntive policy by eliminating the source of the
policy prob lems, the dom ain name system. Another option would be to create a
proce ss through which interests  of Internet stakeholders cou ld fairly and neutra lly
be taken into acco unt. In the end, however, some continuing degree of
background  government presence will probab ly be necessary in order to mainta in
both  the operative degree of legitimacy and control over the coordination proce ss.
A. Abo lish Do ma in Names
One radical solution to the existing dom ain name coordination problem would
simply  be to recognize that the technical standard-setting proce ss has
inadvertently stumbled into a nontechnical policy arena, and that the proper
course  of action is simply  to withdraw, that is, to get rid  of the dom ain name
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150. See, e.g., Vixie, supra note 59 (calling for issuance of meaningless “license plates”
instead of domain names); see also Gigante, supra note 89, at 145 (discussing Vixie’s
proposal).
151. See Dialogue, supra note 50.
152. For this proposal to work, search engine technology would have to improve from its
existing state of the art.  Moreover, certain criteria (such as whether the search engine accepted
payment from companies to be listed at the top) would need to be made transparent.
153. See Maher, supra note 89, at 4 (“Moving to a DNS with meaningless word and number
combinations would likely make all the trademark problems disappear, but this proposal seems
to have almost no support.”); Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual
Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2651-54 (1994) (From
a political economy standpoint, “the opportunity for comprehensive reform is most propitious
before interest groups form around a new technology.”).
system entirely.150 This,  in many ways, wou ld be an ideal result.  In creating the
dom ain name system, the founders of the Internet never imagined or intended that
it wou ld even tually give rise to difficult questions about distribution among the
current, broad group of Internet stakeholde rs.151 Under this approach,  numerical
or unintelligib le text-basis addresses wou ld now be the only source-indicators for
computers on the Internet.  The  loss of the mnemon ic value of dom ain names
would be more than compensated by the gain from the reduction in wasteful
li tigation and other activity surrounding dom ain names.  Internet directories or
other technical solutions cou ld then develop to fill the gap, as, indeed, existing
search engines already do (though somewhat inefficiently).
Such a solution would, in many ways, be most  in keeping with the decentralized
nature of Internet coordination in gene ral. Instead of referring to a single (though
decentralized and distributed) database for the “naming” of particular areas of the
web, Internet naming would be layered on top of the underlying system by
numerous different Internet directories.  The  naming function cou ld thus be
decentralized and open to competition. Different Internet search engines might
structure cyberspace in different ways. Indiv iduals  cou ld then vote with their
feet.152 Tradem ark issues wou ld be settled at the priva te search engine level,
rather than at any central point of coordination. The  technical standard itself
wou ld thus return to a pure ly technical standard, one that does not raise troubling
distributional and policy questions.
Unfortuna tely, it is probably much too late in the day for this option to be
succe ssfully implemented, at least through the current standard-setting proce ss.153
Interes ts are already firmly entrenched. Do main  name holders and existing
dom ain name registrars wou ld raise howls of pro test. Mo reover, the displacement
of such interests  would, at this stage, be a political decision, not a purely
technical one. Having ventured into this arena, the technical standard-setting
proce ss cannot easily extract itself. And although the government cou ld dictate
this result  by fiat, resistance by the larger Internet com munity wou ld likely be
quite  fierce.
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154. See Carl S. Kaplan, A Kind of Constitutional Convention for the Internet (last modified
Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/cyberlaw/23law.html>
(analogizing ICANN to a “unique form of government for the global Internet”).
155. But see Deliberative PollingTM  in Cyberspace (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.law.
Harvard.edu/9-10mtg/idp.html>.
B. Direct Internet Democracy
Another possibility wou ld be to construct a process that formally takes into
account and aggregates the interests  of the various stakeholde rs, that is, the
engineers,  the Internet users, dom ain name owners,  and dom ain name registrars.
Th is is basically a strategy that takes the W hite Paper*s proposal to its logical
conclusion. Instead of governance by a quasi-representative, priva te corporation
such as ICANN, whose board  structure and processes are subject to legitimacy
questions,  a proce ss cou ld be constructed to actively  take into account input from
all walks of the Internet population and aggre gate  this input into a substantive
policy decision. The  idea wou ld be to create  something akin to a direct Internet
democracy on questions of policy, such as the structure of the dom ain name
space. Indeed, the most  recent efforts  of ICANN to turn itself into a “mem bersh ip
organization” constitute an attemp t, in some limited way to create  just such a
structure.
In many ways, the Internet is ideally  suited to aggregation of such preferences
in an informed way. Various position papers cou ld be presented on-line, along
with threaded discussions. Such virtual town meetings cou ld then be followed up
with an Internet referendum. Assuming that the various parties cou ld come to an
accommodation on a legitimate  proce ss, the result  of such a proce ss wou ld then
have a much greater claim to legitimac y, as it wou ld more truly reflect the
interests  of the wider Internet population.
One  problem with this option is that no system currently exists to aggregate
such preference s, and the creation of such a proce ss wou ld be extrem ely difficult,
as the current deb ate over ICA NN ’s mem bersh ip policies indicates. Even
assuming that the various parties cou ld come to some agreement on proce ss, the
details  of such a proce ss wou ld be dauntingly complicated.154 Mo reover, there
may be good reasons to believe that the relevant parties wou ld not come to
agreement on the proce ss, given that the spec ific matter to be determined is
already defined. Jockeying for advantage based on predicted voting patterns
cou ld well make agreement on the proce ss impossible.
In addition, there is also the risk that such direct democracy will not be
adequa tely informed, particularly if technical issues are implicated by the
substantive policy deba tes. Although much of this Article  has focused on the fact
that dom ain name issues are not pure ly technic al, neither are they pure ly pub lic
policy questions.  Indeed, a full appreciation of the availab le options may require
both  a grasp of the policy implications and the possibilities allowed by the
techno logy. Thus, for this reason, too direct an influence on dom ain name
governance is likely not warranted.155
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156. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 423.
157. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) very likely has statutory
jurisdiction over Internet issues, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1994), but has expressly disavowed
any interest in getting involved in Internet governance issues, see Gigante, supra note 11, at
421-22. Instead, the FCC has adopted the very hands-off attitude that has been characteristic
of the Clinton Administration’s approach to Internet governance issues. See A Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce: Executive Summary (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www
.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/summary.html> (setting forth the Administration*s
approach to Internet issues).
Given the above concern s, it will be interesting to see whether ICANN can
succe ssfully create  a representative structure that is viewed as sufficiently
legitimate. The  most  recent proposals are beginning to open up the structure to
more participation, but still place the bulk  of autho rity in the hands of the
governing board. However,  if ICANN is ultimately  successful in creating such a
structure, and if such a structure is both  sufficiently inclusive and wide ly regarded
as legitimate, then many of the concerns will have been addressed. The
difficulties noted above, however, suggest that this will not be an easy task.
C. Continuing Background Government Presence
Constructing a new proce ss may, however, be unnecessary given the
availab ility of an existing body for aggregating preferences in determining the
pub lic interest:  the gove rnment. There  is a reason why difficult policy questions
in other areas are not addressed through app eals to “consensus .” Policy questions
are far too messy and peo ple have far too divergent views. W hile consensus-
seeking might work in the New England town meeting, it tends to fail at the
national level.  Go vernm ent, for all of its faults, provides the mechanism through
which the preferences of a larger population are aggregated and expressed in
pub lic policy. The  Internet today, and in the future, will implicate the interests  of
a broader and broader population. In the dom ain name con text, the t ime for town
meetings may well be past.
Continuing government involvement, if properly  limited, wou ld not mean a
radical change in the status quo; in fact, it wou ld mean less change. In many
ways, the current problems facing the dom ain name system can be direc tly traced
to the federal government*s (and the NSF*s) stated intention to withdraw from
Internet coordination altogether. The  NSF*s presence (and the presence of
DARPA) in the past served, in effect,  as a kind of government guarantee that
issues concerning administration of the dom ain name system would never get that
far out of line from the pub lic interest.  In the absence of such a guarantee,
crippling issues regarding legitimacy and autho rity have arisen.156 Although the
gove rnment’s recent involvement in handing control over the dom ain name
system to ICANN has eased some of these concerns in the short run, legitimacy
concerns will con tinue to dog ICANN, particularly after the government
even tually withdraws from dom ain name governance, as it intends on doing.
Such problems may be obviated if the NSF or the Department  of Commerce (or
some similar organization157), instead of withdrawing from dom ain name
governance entirely,  simply  maintains some limited continuing background  role
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158. See Shaw, supra note 21, at 127-28 (suggesting ways in which various government
agencies might be involved).
159. Under its charter, the NSF is authorized to foster the development of computer
technologies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(4) (1994); see also High-Performance Computing Act
(HPCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501, 5521 (1994) (authorizing the NSF to promote development of
network computing). See generally Gigante, supra note 11, at 414.
160. In this Article, I have focused in particular on the NSF and the Department of
Commerce as the two most likely agencies, mostly because of their existing role in Internet
issues. It may well be that an alternative agency may be better structured to address the
particular types of issues raised by the domain name system. For the purposes of this Article,
however, I am primarily concerned that some government body accept responsibility for this
issue. The identity of that government body is a question I have not expressly addressed in this
project.
in Internet coordination. Indeed, the renewal of NSI*s contract presented the
perfect opp ortun ity for a fresh consideration of the terms of that con tract,  perhaps
after a period for notice and com ment. In light of the Internet*s widespread
dissatisfaction with NSI*s handling of various allocation issues, any new contract
cou ld have been structured to avoid  preexisting prob lems. Indeed, the contract
cou ld have been structured to offer competition among various registrars. The
rights of the various parties cou ld have been better defined. Coordination with the
trademark office might have been made possible.158 Alternatively, a more limited
version of the not-for -profit  corporation envisioned by the W hite Paper cou ld be
given some delegated power to engage in dom ain name management functions,
so long as a background  acco untab ility to the federal government is maintained
(for example, through a contractual relationship, as with the NSF or the
Department  of Comm erce).
W hile the details  wou ld take some effort to work out,  the important feature of
such involvement is that the questions of legitimacy in dom ain name coordination
would be substantially addressed by the continuing background  government
presence. Of all the parties involved in the dom ain name dispute, the NSF has the
strongest claim to management of and respo nsibility for the dom ain name space.
Up to now, desp ite dissatisfaction with NSI,  none of the other parties has
challenged the NSF*s underlying autho rity to confer the Internet management
responsibilities upon NSI.  The  NSF is, moreover,  expressly a public-regarding
institution, charged with a pub lic mandate.159 It is ultimately  acco untab le through
the dem ocra tic proce ss. It does not rely on any priva te interests, or coalit ion of
priva te interests, for funding. Th is prese nts a contrast with existing Internet
stakeholders or groups of stakeholde rs, such as the IAHC, NSI,  or ICANN, who
would seek to take on this role  and who have acco rding ly been subject to
challenge by other members  of the wider Internet com munity.  By once again
contracting out coordination responsib ilities, the NSF cou ld deleg ate these
responsibilities to the priva te sector while  maintaining a useful background  check
on the priva te sector*s execution of these responsibilities (as in the case with the
NSI contract).
In addition to conferring legitimacy and autho rity on the coordinating and
technical management bod ies, the NSF, or some other agency,160 cou ld also take
a role  in actively  asking some of the larger policy questions concerning dom ain
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161. This Article has not sought to articulate a particular substantive solution to the issues
facing the domain name system. Instead, it has focused on the underlying flaws in the existing
processes, which have structurally prevented adequate consideration of such issues.
162. But not all Internet participants view the process as legitimate. See Comments on the
Registration and Administration of Internet Domain Names <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/email/> (including comments submitted by WIPO, EU, and IAHC).
163. The more formalized and transparent (and therefore legitimate) the processes become,
the more ICANN itself begins to resemble government, and the less it can claim some inherent
advantage over government regulation.
164. ICANN is, by definition, captured insofar as its board members come from the industry
that it is designed to regulate.
name allocation.161 Indeed, the response  to the Department  of Commerce*s W hite
Paper illustrates the value of government as a forum for expressing and
aggregating interests, and coordinating the effectuation of such interests  on
questions of policy. Prior to the Department  of Commerce*s involvement, the
future status of the dom ain name system was substantially in dou bt. Mo reover, no
organized mechanism existed for the consideration of various perspectives on the
dom ain name problem. Attem pts to organize and coo rdina te change on a priva te
basis  met with significant resistance and uncertainty over autho rity. By setting
forth the Green Paper and soliciting comm ents, the Department  of Commerce,
whatever the merits  of its substantive proposal, at least established a proce ss that
many Internet partic ipants  appear to view as legitimate.162 Th is suggests, at the
very least,  that the government cou ld have a valuab le role  in continuing to foster
debate, not so much over who shou ld decide the shape of dom ain name space (the
current deb ate offered by the W hite Paper),  but what that shape shou ld look like.
Although a priva te organization, such as ICANN, can seek to take on this role, it
will, by its very nature, constantly be subject to lingering questions about its
legitimacy and possible  conflicts of interest.
It is true that government involvement, even in the background, may,  to some
extent,  make dom ain name governance less responsive to technological change.
To some extent,  this may be a necessary price of a more  legitima te proce ss. On
the other hand, the conflicts and struggles currently resulting from the existing
priva te coordination model cast some doubt on its claims at being significan tly
more responsive to technological change. Indeed, as pressure increases on
ICANN to make its procedures more formalized and transparent,  we can expect
that its responsiveness will be reduced.163 Mo reover, technical input may be
incorporated by the government agency through reliance on advisory comm ittees.
Similar ly, traditional concerns about  the risk of agency capture are less acute,
since the alternative, an organization such as ICANN, is subject to even greater
critique on this score.164
It is important to note  here that this policy-shaping role  wou ld be limited to
certain  questions,  such as those about the dom ain name system (e.g.,  how many
and what kinds of top-level domains), that strong ly implicate substantive policy
and involve a wide range of stakeholde rs; it wou ld not app ly to primarily
technical questions,  such as those involving the underlying Internet pro toco l.
Such latter questions are app ropriately left to the existing standard-setting
proce ss, since that proce ss is (at least for now) well  ada pted to answering them
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165. To be sure, some questions may closely implicate both substantive policy and technical
standards, and in such cases we might envision some sort of closer interaction between the two
processes. Or, relatedly, there may be debates over when the standard-setting process has in
fact “failed.”
166. Some might be concerned that government involvement in domain name issues might
make it more likely that the government would use such involvement to engage in other, more
intrusive, forms of regulation, such as over content. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 154. My
feeling is that such concerns are overstated. To the extent the government wishes to engage in
such regulation, it already has the available means to do so, and this background role in domain
name coordinators would add little to its existing power.
167. Johnson and Post argue that any single government will be unable to adequately exert
control over global domain name registration and that any attempt to do so amounts to an
“illegitimate extra-territorial power grab.” Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1380. In my view,
this takes too literally the concept of Internet as a separate “space,” and neglects the fact that
real-world institutions (e.g., IANA and NSI) in fact exert just this sort of control over the
domain name system. As previously discussed, real-world institutions currently control the
databases that coordinate the existing domain name system, and powerful network effects, as
a practical matter, prevent exit from the network.
and surely better suited than government involvement. Instead, the government*s
role  as a coordinator and mediator of differing interests  wou ld be implicated only
in those limited areas, such as the dom ain name con trove rsy, where broader
policy issues are at stake, and perhaps even then only after the existing standard-
setting proce ss and other decentralized coordination mechanisms have failed to
arrive at an app ropriate consensus or solution.165 Th is Article  has argued that the
dom ain name controve rsy is just such an area.
Mo re broadly,  the exam ple of the dom ain name dispu te suggests that
government has a valuab le though limited role  to play in maintaining, through its
very background  presence, the stabili ty and authority of those few areas of the
Internet requiring centralized coordination. It also has a role  in recognizing when
discussions about the Internet reflect substantive policy issues, rather than pure ly
technical issues, and stepping in to resolve conflicting interests  that cannot be
legitimate ly settled under the standard-setting model of Internet governance.
Although the government shou ld rightly be wary of stifling technical innovation
through ham-handed intervention, it shou ld also be wary of being so pessim istic
about its ability to deal with technology that it abdicates too quick ly its traditional
role  in mediating differing substantive policy positions raised by techno logy.166
Converse ly, propon ents of the decentralized, standard-setting model of Internet
governance also need to be aware of the limits of that model of coordination,
particularly when applied to issues that involve conflicting value and
distributional claims. Too often, government participation is viewed as all-or-
nothing. Yet a more nuanced and lighter involvement may be possible  and even
desirable. W ith all of the anarc hic rheto ric of the Interne t, it is often easy to
forget that the very existence of the current Internet took place, not in a
government vacuum, but with substantial government funding and supp ort.167
It is also important to note  that the government referred to is the U.S.
Go vernm ent, and cannot purport to speak for other governm ents, who may have
legitimate  claims over the gene ric dom ain name space. Thus, to the extent that
some mod est government involvement may be necessary to facilitate Internet
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168. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,748 (1998)
(noting that “there is much opportunity for enlarging the .us domain space”).
169. Moreover, future browsers might be configured simply to place a default term on the
end of a given address, depending on where you are located. Seen this way, the addition of
“.us” to the end of a domain name is akin to the country code used to reach U.S. phone
numbers from abroad.
170. See Foster, supra note 55, at 201-06. “The United Nations and its specialized bodies
have a critical role to play in registering the Internet domain name system.” Id. at 201.
171. See Summary of Comments, supra note 63 (summarizing comments submitted in
response to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration*s (“NTIA”)
RFC, and documenting the NTIA*s position that “[t]he private sector, with input from
governments, should develop stable, consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain
name registration and management that adequately defines responsibilities and maintains
accountability”).
172. See Post, supra note 4, ¶ 23 (treating network technical specifications as part of the
“law of cyberspace”).
coordination, the gene ric top-level domains may need to be reconfigured to
account for at least this l imitation in government autho rity. Thus, the “.com” and
“.edu” domains may need to be expressly made parts  of the “.us” top-level
domain.168 Th is wou ld be, at least on its surface, a dram atic change in the shape
of dom ain name space. Yet the simple  addition of “.us” wou ld mere ly recognize
the fact that many “.com” domains are located in the U.S. and the fact that the
U.S. Governm ent has little legitimate  claim to governing dom ain name space
outside its bord ers.169 Coordination between gove rnments may require that some
role  be played by relevant international organizations,  such as the United Nations
or the WIPO.170
Such a limited government role  is not inconsistent with the current
administration*s concerns regarding leaving Internet development  to the priva te
sector.171 Indeed, as the doma in name problem has illustrated, premature
withdrawal of government support may not result  in a flourishing of priva te sector
initiatives, but may instead result in substantial unce rtainty and inefficiency.
Because of the difficulty of reaching consensus and the lack of clear autho rity,
lack of government involvement in a distributed network environment may not
result  in freedom, but in para lysis and an inability to organize and actively  pursue
the pub lic good. Although the government is rightly aware of its limitations in
effectively  predicting the course  of technological develop ment, it shou ld also
recognize those few areas where a centralized coordinating role  is necessary to
facilitate future development.
CO N C LU S IO N
The dom ain name problem is unique in many ways, yet it may be a precursor
to future debates regarding technical standards.  As the Internet becomes more and
more important in our daily  lives, its methods of governance will come under
increasing scrutiny.  Issues that were once pure ly technical may now have serious
distributional conseq uences.  Converse ly, issues that were once pure ly substantive
may soon have a large technical-standards com pon ent, as more and more Internet
regulation becomes written into the underlying code.172 Take, for example, the
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173. See Lessig, Constitution of Code, supra note 86, at 183-84 (discussing other areas in
which the code regulates).
174. See id.; Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1408.
discussions currently raging over standards for rating and filtering Internet
con tent, or over the addition of copyright management information.173
As the above analysis  indicates, care will need to be taken to ensure that
adequa te processes are in place to take into account the interests  of the relevant
stakeholde rs. As the division between technical standards and law narrows, 174 we
may see a similar convergence in the processes for achieving such standards in
the future. Mo re broadly,  care shou ld be taken in importing the dominant
standard-setting model of Internet coordination into other arenas.  Unthinking use
of the standard-setting model,  without an understanding of its underlying
assumptions, may result  in the exclusion of parties who have a legitimate  claim
to the proce ss and, acco rding ly, a false “consensus .” In many ways, the Internet
is quite  exceptional, but it is important to keep in mind prec isely what those ways
are.
